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Complaints that West German foreign policy in general and national 
security policy in particular have more often than not taken place within a 
vacuum of societal attention, interest, information, and discussion are as 
old as the Federal Republic itself. Compared to the United States, it has 
indeed been difficult to identify, on the elite level, a national strategic 
community extending beyond the professional military, a few selected 
decision makers, and journalists who permanently and competently would 
have scrutinized ongoing security issues, from weapons procurement to 
Alliance strategy, with visible feedbacks into the decision process and with 
enlightening and mobilizing functions for the general public. This absti-
nence can be explained by the history of the FRG's defense contribution, 
by its position within the Western Alliance, and by the initial preoccupa-
tion of its political elites with economic growth and the division of 
Germany, but explanation obviously does not get rid of what is being 
explained. 
Involvement of the general public in foreign policy and security issues 
has been seemingly unpredictable, paradoxical, and inconsistent. Sudden 
surges of attention to specifi.c problems have been paralleled or followed 
by long lulls of concern with other issues. Rearmament and a possible 
nuclear rote for the FRG were widely debated in the 1950s, but dramatic 
shifts in the superpower military balance and in NATO strategy were 
largely ignored in the 1960s. The new Ostpolitik after 1969 received 
considerable emotional support-quite unlike simultaneous arms control 
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efforts like MFR and SALT, components of an American "Ostpolitik" 
that was a precondition for the German efforts to promote detente. 
However, behind these "hiccups" of public opinion one can discern 
systematic patterns. For all practical purposes, national security and 
foreign affairs are fairly remote from most people's everyday knowledge, 
experience, and concerns. In view of the low personal salience of the issue 
area, people lack the incentives to collect, store, and analyze systematically 
information related to these areas. Under these conditions a temporary 
mobilization or polarization of public opinion over issues of national 
security will, almost invariably, be characterized by a series of distinctive 
features. First, it will focus on general, rather than on specific or technical, 
problems since the cognitive requirements for a sophisticated debate over 
details are lacking. Second, it takes highly motivated and knowledgeable 
minority groups of "opinion leaders" to catalyze mobilization. Third, as 
catalyzing a public discussion and bringing issues from the periphery of 
public opinion to the center of the political debate does not dramatically 
increase the general public's information or information-seeking behavior, 
public responses will be dominated by emotions, sympathies, and anti-
pathies, rather than by well-informed judgment. A corollary is, of course, 
that which does not lend itself to emotional treatment never comes to the 
forefront of public opinion on foreign affairs and defense. 
lf these general notions of the role of international politics in public 
opinion are correct, then the German experience well into the late 1970s is 
not at all unusual, but conforms to expectations as well as to what we have 
seen in other nations. Judging from the presentation in the media, 
however, something dramatic has happened to the West German public's 
attitudes toward national security within the last few years. lt is hard to 
give a specific date for this alleged change. The heat and style of 
discussions over the "immoral neutron bomb" certainly mark quite a 
departure from times when nuclear warheads could be deployed in the 
FRG or withdrawn without much public attention. Then came, of course, 
NATO's December 1979 decision that created the specter of new nuclear 
missiles in Europe for many residents of the continent. Thereafter, many 
observers and decision makers, European and particularly American, have 
expressed considerable concern over the development of public senti-
ments that they see as moving toward pacifism and neutralism, toward a 
potentially dangerous erosion of mass support for the Western Alliance in 
general and for nuclear deterrence and related military measures in 
particular. This concern carries with it deep implications regarding the 
process of legitimizing defense and military strategy in Western democra-
cies. At the same time, it addresse.s the very practical necessity of 
designing and pursuing defense and security policies that promise to be 
effective according to established military and strategic criteria, while 
simultaneously taking into account new realities of the social context 
surrounding national security-provided there are such "new realities." 
This precisely is the point where the analytic eff ort of this paper will be 
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focused. There is ample reason to doubt that we have a comprehensive and 
adequate understanding of the scope and extent of the alleged dramatic 
changes in West German public opinion. There can be no doubt that 
within small, but very active and vociferous, groups in the FRG a 
wholesale erosion of support for NATO and for established ways of 
providing for security has indeed taken place, that the United States, not 
the USSR, is seen as the primary threat to peace. There also can be no 
doubt that segments of the media, of the churches, of some unions, and of 
some parties have served as resounding "echo chambers" for the themes of 
these activist groups of the peace movement. The campaign for the March 
1983 parliamentary elections was even dubbed the "missile campaign," as 
the appropriate position of the FRG on the implementation of the double-
track decision had finally become an issue of partisan dispute. The final 
outcome of the election, together with some other considerations indi-
cates, however, that the center of gravity of "new realities" in the FRG 
may thus far have remained confined to less numerous but very outspoken 
groups of opinion leaders. 
The most important of these considerations is that the missile issue is 
not one that should lend itself easily to the mobilization of mass opinion, 
since it involves myriads of technological and strategic details. lt is not a 
vital but simple problem like "should we join NATO?" or "should we have 
better relations with the East?" Because it is so complex, the emotional 
content of the issue does predominate. If the problem is personally very 
salient, rejection of new missiles may structure other attitudes; for exam-
ple, it may lead to a rejection of NATO. If it is not, dissonance between 
endorsing NATO and disliking missiles may be tolerable or not even be 
perceived. The crucial dividing line, then, may not be between the ones 
liking or disliking missiles (most people dislike them, of course), but 
between the ones for whom this sentiment is highly salient or personally 
rather unimportant. The key problem before us in attempting to arrive at 
a comprehensive picture of recent developments and changes in public 
opinion on national security in the FRG, therefore, is to avoid jumping to 
far-reaching conclusions on the demise of the foreign policy consensus 
from some isolated survey results. Before lamenting or advocating drastic 
action, it is mandatory to try to ascertain to what extent and why decision 
makers actually have to deal with new realities in the field of defense-
related mass political attitudes. 
This chapter will do so in three steps. First, a descriptive overview of 
public opinion on various components of images of the Soviet Union, of 
national security, of deterrence, and of the Allies will be presented. lt will 
stress developments over time and contain critical discussions of the 
available survey items, of what one can and cannot conclude from them. 
lncluded will also be an analysis of the consistency of attitudes between 
the various themes within each image duster. This historical treatment of 
the trends in public opinion over the l 970s is required in order to put the 
current situation into perspective. The second main section will consist of 
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a modest attempt to evaluate the interrelationship of attitudes among the 
four main themes that have just been mentioned. In the third part, finally, 
the impact of a few potential determinants of national security attitudes 
will be examined, including individuals' positions in the social structure 
and their partisan affiliations. 
lt is critical to bear in mind certain theoretical and methodological 
caveats because their practical implications will be encountered again and 
again below. Unlike Schoessler and Weede in their impressive book on 
West German Elite Views on National Security and Foreign Policy lssues 
(1978), we will be dealing with mass opinion. What is everyday fare to the 
political and military elites they have surveyed can easily be enigmatic to 
most randomly selected individuals. A survey item that taps previous or 
ongoing refiection on familiar substance in an elite survey may easily 
overtax the average resi)ondent. Personal salience of, and information on, 
the subject matter to be surveyed, therefore, are of vital importance for a 
reasonable assessment of public opinion on security. Unfortunately, both 
these dimensions are often included when surveys are made or reported. 
People are asked whether they welcome President Reagan's decision to 
build Enhanced Radiation Weapons (ERWs), they are not asked before 
whether they know what ERWs are. People get asked which part of the 
double-track decision they prefer; they are not asked in advance to what 
extent they care about which part is implemented. Because of these 
omissions we know less than we should on the personal importance of 
various components of security policy and almost nothing on the degree of 
knowledge or ignorance ofthese matters in the mass public. Furthermore, 
reactive measurement applied in this way is bound to produce "nonatti-
tudes," responses that sound and look like judgments, evaluations, expec-
tations but that have not been there before the survey and, most likely, 
will not be there afterwards. What is worse, if these dimensions are not 
ascertained in the original interviews, it is extremely hard post festum to 
separate random responses from meaningful ones. 
In order to realize the magnitude of these diffi.culties, it is necessary to 
have a look at the types of items on security and def ense that are typically 
surveyed. Generally speaking, they fall into five broad classes. First, there 
are questions designed to measure individuals' evaluations of the impor-
tance of political objectives, among them economic or social goals, na-
tional security, and many others, for themselves and for the FRG as a 
whole. General policy objectives tend to belong to the dass of so-called 
valence issues: most people agree they are acceptable ones, that unemploy-
ment and infiation should be reduced, economic growth furthered, old-
age-pensions guaranteed, the environment should be protected, crime 
reduced, peace preserved, and national security and independence pro-
tected. These issues become politically relevant when people disagree on 
the rank order of their salience and on which parties, coalitions, or 
candidates are most capable to implement them. 
The second and third groups of defense-related attitudes fall into the 
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dass of "position issues." People disagree on what should be done. The 
second dass of security attitudes deals with second-order goals, with the 
implications of the usually consensual feeling that national security, 
survival, and independence are good things. Does this imply defense 
within NATO, European defense collaboration, purely national defense or 
deterrence, neutralism, or attempts to substitute military security by 
negotiations and political detente; or does it require a stronger emphasis 
on nudear deterrence as opposed to conventional capabilities? In the third 
dass, we have dispute on the appropriate strategies to realize these second-
order goals. Do we need more or less military manpower or weapons; what 
is the adequate level of def ense spending, should there be a draft; do we 
require particular weapon systems like Pershing Ils or ERWs, what 
should be the guidelines for arms control negotiations, and so on? 
Tue fourth dass of defense opinions contains judgments of facts, 
present, future, or hypothetical. Who is or is going to be militarily 
superior? What are the size of the threat and the likelihood ofwar? What is 
war going to look like? Who is likely to win? Is the United States going to 
honor her commitments? 
The fifth dass, finally, comprises affective orientations toward actors, 
both internally and internationally; toward the armed forces or the peace 
movement; toward NATO, the Allies, or the Soviet Union and other 
Warsaw Pact countries. Are these actors evaluated as necessary, friendly, 
reliable, compromising, peaceful, and so on? If other nations are the 
objects of such evaluations we find ourselves in the realm of national 
stereotypes and prejudices. 
The extent to which reactive measurement can produce valid and 
reliable findings on opinions on security varies sharply across these five 
classes. The smallest problems are probably encountered with evaluations 
of actors. National stereotypes are widespread, and even without extensive 
previous reasoning many respondents are in a position to state whether a 
given stimulus evokes positive, indifferent, or negative feelings in them. 
Difficulties become somewhat larger with the first dass of judgments on 
salience. Most people are able to rank-order very general political objec-
tives according to their personal importance, but most people will also be 
unable to differentiate between personal importance and salience for the 
nation as a whole. If national security, compared to others, is perceived as 
a less pressing problem for oneself and for society, this has far-reaching 
implications for the assessment of attitudes in the other three dasses. 
If salience is comparatively low, information will be so, too. Asking 
people with little interest and little knowledge for their opinions on what 
national security policy should look like, what steps would be appropriate 
to pursue it, and what are the basic parameters of the security environ-
ment, is likely to evoke "non-attitudes" (Converse 1970, Achen 1975). 
Specifically this means that we have to expect high proportions of refusals 
and "don't knows" and concentration of responses in ambiguous catego-
ries, if they are provided. Moreover, sizeable effects of instruments, 
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notably question wording, will be likely. lt makes a lot of difference for 
respondents who don't think a lot about these things whether you ask 
them about "strategic systems" or about "nuclear missiles." Finally, 
blatant contradictions between responses to different items will occur if we 
survey issue areas sufficiently remote from the respondents. People will, 
for example, opt for the necessity of a strong conventional defense but 
name military spending as the field in which government expenditures 
should be cut first; or they will simultaneously agree with the double-track 
decision and with the demand not to deploy any new missiles in Europe. lt 
is only exaggerating slightly to say that adding high complexity of issues to 
respondents' low concern and information enables pollsters to project a 
wide variety of attitudes onto large indifferent segments of the population. 
This, of course, is a potentially very dangerous situation, in which 
everyone can pick--or even produce-the evidence in support of a 
position. To ascertain, with a reasonable degree of confidence, whether 
what we are currently witnessing is a surge of interest and information or 
of alienation and emotion in regard to national security affairs, therefore, 
is of crucial importance for an adequate assessment of the fundamental 
societal conditions under which decision makers will have to act in the 
future. As should have become obvious, such an enterprise has to be a 
critique of methods at least as much as a narrative of findings. As yet no 
systematic and rigorous study of the development and the dynamics of the 
cognitive and affective dimensions of defense-related mass opinion in the 
FRG is available. Summarizing empirical data for the FRG can thus only 
be a first step toward evaluating the type and range of conclusions they 
permit. 
Lest this be misunderstood, existing public opinion data can and must 
be taken seriously. lt must, however, be examined less cavalierly than is 
frequently the case. Only then can meaningful conclusions be reached 
concerning what can be said and above all what cannot be said about the 
evolution of public attitudes on national security policy. To this effort we 
nowturn. 
S alience of National S ecurity 
According to the theoretical considerations presented in the introduction, 
salience of national security issues should be a crucial variable for an 
adequate assessment of public opinion on these matters. Three aspects of 
salience must be diff erentiated: importance of the issue for the FRG as a 
whole, personal importance, and level of personal interest and informa-
tion. 
In a multitude of surveys respondents have l?een asked what they 
believe tobe the most important political problems for the FRG. There 
are two basic question formats. In the first, people can name as many 
problems as they want to. In the second, they are to name the most 
important problem, then the one they rank second in importance, then the 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 107 
one they rank third (sometimes this is continued beyond third rank). The 
first format allows multiple responses, the second format invites them. 
Therefore, the data in Table 4.1 are not strictly comparable, because the 
second format evokes less salient nominations from respondents who, 
with the first format, would come up with just one problem. 
Table 4.1 nevertheless conveys a clear and consistent picture. As in 
most modern democracies, economic and domestic issues are seen as most 
important tasks for the political system. Their preponderance was less 
notable in the late l 960s and early l 970s, when the economic situation of 
the FRG was still rather rosy, but after 1973 economic and domestic 
policies regularly received more than 80 percent of the nominations for 
most important problems. 
Furthermore, it would be mistaken to conclude from Table 4.1 that the 
West German public during the earlier years devoted its "surplus" atten-
tion (that not absorbed by economic matters) to foreign affairs. Ostpolitik, 
reunification, problems of Berlin, and FRG-GDR relations are very 
peculiar aspects of West German politics, highly interrelated with internal 
politics and not a normal component of foreign policy-according to 
official doctrine and also to mass perceptions. The high importance 
ascribed to this issue area well into the early 1970s is no indication at all 
that public opinion was looking "outward." lt is rather a particular 
component of preoccupation with German politics. 
Nominations of foreign policy issues in the strict sense as most impor-
tant problems for the FRG have declined steadily over the 1970s. Among 
them maintaining peace has always played the most prominent role, but 
with the same downward trend over the 1970s. After the first term of 
Wtlly Brandt as chancellor, preservation of peace seems to have been taken 
for granted by many of those who a few years earlier had thought this to be 
a very pressing problem. Only in the early 1980s has the salience of the 
preservation of peace increased somewhat in surveys, but not dramatically 
(nine percent of overall responses in 1982). Matters relating to defense, 
national security, NATO, the Bundeswehr, or to European integration or 
foreign policy in general, have never been selected as most important 
problems for the FRG by more than very small fractions of the popula-
tion. Unfortunately, the cross-national poll done for the Atlantic Institute 
in September 1982 (frequently referred to in other chapters of this book) is 
not directly comparable to Table 4.1. In that study, salience of issues was 
surveyed in a close-ended format, and the ten stimuli provided for choice 
seem to have caused responses to deviate from what is usually observed 
with open-ended questions. "Nudear weapons" and "excessive govern-
ment spending," for example, received ten and 12 percent of overall 
responses, respectively, but both items are seldom volunteered if no list to 
choose from is provided. 
An overwhelming majority of West Germans thus views "bread and 
butter" issues as the most important ones for the country: a strong, stable, 
and growing economy; low unemployment and inßation; functioning 
Table 4.1 Whet ere the most important political problems for the FRG today? 
lfD lfD ZA lfD lfD SFK SFK lfD SFK SFK lfD SFK SFK ZA SFK FGW cc 
426-7 823 
1 /68a 1 /69a 9/69b 111oa 1 /71 a 1 /72b 3/72b 5/72a 10/72b 1 /73b 6/13a 10/73b 11115b 1 Of76b 11 f76b 11 t8ob 2/82b 
Economic 43 25 44 38 45 45 51 37 51 47 47 55 73 58 61 54 54 
Situation 
German politics 7 11 23 14 20 36: 33 23 36 37 15 31 21 34 32 29 26 
Ostpolitik, Berlin, 29 33 15 25 15 10 9 26 6 8 27 4 3 2 4 6 2 
reunification, 
GOR 
Maintaining peace 13 15 7 11 8 3 3 5 4 4 3 4 0 2 1 3 9 
Foreign policy in 0 1 3 2 3 3 2 1 2 3 2 3 1 2 1 6 5 
general 
European 3 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
community 
Defense, national 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
securitY, NATO, 
Bundeswehr 
Others 5 10 5 7 7 1 2 9 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 2 3 
aMultiple responses; percentages of overall responses 
bpercentages of responses for up to three problems per respondent 
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social services and social security, and so forth. In the "German politics" 
category that ranks second we also find concerns such as law and order, 
liberalization of laws, transportation, housing, education, and environ-
ment. The "German problem" has lost very much of its importance as 
perceived by the mass public, and foreign policy in general, peace, 
security, and defense in particular, are comparatively marginal problems 
for the nation in the views of most people. The events of late 1979, 
however, have led to some increase of concern with national security 
(Figure 4.1). 
Regarding personal salience, things look very much the same. In 
contrast to the open-ended measurement of importance for the FRG, 
personal salience is usually ascertained by presenting respondents with a 
list of items they have to scale according to importance for themselves. As 
the lists of items and the forms of scales diff er from survey to survey, strict 
longitudinal comparisons are hard to perform. 
In spite of this methodological caveat, Table 4.2 shows with sufficient 
clarity that defense and national security by no means top the list of 
personal concerns. With some variations over time in rank (that are easily 
accounted for by macroeconomic developments and political events in the 
FRG ), inflation, unemployment, and old-age pensions are the personally 
most salient issues with very high percentages of "very important" ratings 
and very high average scale scores. A somewhat less important duster of 
items comprises law and order, style of government, education, protection 
of the environment, and taxation. 
Foreign policy problems generally rank lowest for most respondents; 
they are described as personally "very important" by 20 to 40 percent of 
the samples---as opposed to usually well above 70 percent for the top 
group of economic issues. There are no discernible systematic longitudinal 
:fluctuations in the personal salience of these items. There is, however, a 
major instrument effect on the importance ascribed to military security 
(bottom row of Table 4.2). In September 1969 andin September 1980 the 
item was "protection against Russian attack"; in January 1972, it was 
"strengthening NATO"; in September 1972, "military security." "Mili-
tary security" without any specific reference to the Western Alliance or to 
the threat from the East obviously is personally least important, whereas a 
reminder by the wording of the stimulus that it is about protection against 
an attack significantly increases its personal salience. This implies two 
things. First, most respondents cannot have a very solid and cognitively 
well-founded and differentiated image of national security if variations in 
the wording of stimuli have such a sizeable effect on the evaluation of 
personal salience. Second, it is probably possible to manipulate the 
ranking of policy goals according to personal importance to a considerable 
extent by appropriately choosing stimuli. 
This point can be further illustrated by another strong effect of question 
wording on ratings of personal salience that can be observed if "national 
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security," "defense," and so on, are replaced by "peace" in close-ended 
questions. Infas (Monatsberichte) monthly has respondents choose the 
three personally most important aspects of life from a list containing six 
items: social security, law and order, peace, local living conditions, 
economic prosperity, and industrial democracy. Already in 1976, peace 
received about one-sixth of nominations as being among the personally 
most important aspects, a rating that the more military items related to the 
preservation of peace never did receive in open-ended question formats 
(see, for example, Table 4.2). Whereas for four of these items almost no 
changes occurred from the mid-1970s to early 1983 (industrial democracy 
about five percent, economic prosperity about 20 percent, local living 
conditions about ten percent, and social security about 25 percent), the 
percentage of nominations of peace rose to around 25 percent; those of law 
and order fell by almost ten percentage points to about 12 percent. 
Because of the fixed set of stimuli, the personal salience of peace is 
certainly exaggerated in these data, but peace is obviously nevertheless 
evaluated as personally much more salient than concrete military measures 
to preserve it, and it has come to be rated as personally far more salient 
than it was several years ago. This corresponds, of course, to the recent 
trend that can be observed in the final column of Table 4.1 on the 
importance of the preservation of peace for the country as a whole. 
Our finding of rather low personal salience of foreign policy in general 
and national security in particular for the mass public in the FRG from the 
early 1970s to the present is corroborated by a number of scattered survey 
items that are not directly comparable in a longitudinal fashion. In a 197 4 
survey (ZA 757) people were required to select the personally most and 
least important political goals out of a list of eight items. "Strong defense" 
was most important for the smallest group (six percent) and was most 
frequently picked as least important (21 percent). In 1976 IfD presented 
respondents with a long list of problems, asking them to indicate about 
which they were personally "very worried." The most frightening items 
were unemployment (90 percent), inflation (84 percent), terrorism (48 
percent), and crime (39 percent). National security ranked very low as a 
personal concern: too many Western compromises vis-a-vis the East (rank 
9, 23 percent), Russian military superiority (rank 10, 22 percent), the 
Bundeswehr not being strong enough (rank 31, six percent); Europe and 
the United Stated drifting apart (rank 32, five percent). One year later IfD 
made respondents pick three "wishes" out of a list of ten goals according 
to personal satisfaction with their attainment. Although reducing unem-
ployment and stopping inflation were selected by 71 and 61 percent, 
respectively, only 16 percent of the "wishes" referred to "better relations 
with the East," 15 percent to "more security against the Russians." 
In another 1976 survey (ZA 823) people were asked what they were 
most afraid of concerning the future of the FRG and their personal future. 
On the future of the FRG, 34 percent said they had no fears; of those who 
had fears, 44 percent named economic difficulties, 27 percent parties and 
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• Table 4.2 Personal importance of problems (Rank Order) 
ZA SFK ZA ZA FGW FGW FGW FGW 
426-7 839-42 823 
9/69 1/72 9/72 9/76 2/80 6/80 9/80 2/83 
Number of 
Ranks 15b 12c 15d 7d 7d 11d 11b 9d 
Inflation 1(9.0) 1(2.8) 1(83) 2(81) 2(75) 2(70) 3(8.8) 4(53) 
Unemployment, a 2(2.8) a 1(82) 1 (81) 1(76) 1(9.0) 1(88) 
job security 
Old-age pensions 2(8.5) a 3(64) a 3(70) 3(69) 2(8.8) 2(64) 
Taxes 4(7.6) a 6(52) a a a 6(7.8) a 
Law and order a a 2(64) 3(59) 4(56) 5(56) a 6(41) 
Moral 3(8.2) a a a a a 4(8.2) a 
government 
Environmental a a 7(45) a 5(51) 6(51) 7(7.6) 5(48) 
protection 
Education 6(7.2) a 8(37) 4(50) a 7{43) 817.5) a 
Reunification 7(7.1) 10(1.3) a a a a 10(7.1) a 
Relations with 8(7.0) a 10(29) a 6(41) 8(37) 9(7.4) 7(27) 
the West, US 
Relations with 9(6.4) 5(2.1) 9(29) 7(23) 7(33) 10(29) 11 (6.6) 9(23) 
the East, 
USSR 
Military security, 5(7.3) 8(1.8) 13(19) a a a 5(8.0) a 
strengthening 
NATO, 
protection 
against USSR 
attack 
aNot surveyed 
b1n brackets: average score on scale from O (no personal importancel to 10 (highest 
personal importance). 
c In brackets: average score on scale from -3 (unimportant) to +3 (important). 
d1n brackets: percentage "very important" 
ideologies, 24 percent a foreign threat, and seven percent other fears. 
Forty percent had no fears regarding their personal future; of the other 
respondents, 53 percent were most afraid of personal economic trouble, 
insufficient old-age pensions, and poverty; 31 percent of illness, aging, 
and dying; ten percent of war; and four percent each were most afraid of 
communism, radicalism, and other threats. What is remarkable about 
these data is the extent to which foreign threat is seen as personally very 
remote. One-quarter of respondents who have fears about the future of the 
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Table4.3 What political events from the past twelve months do you remember (SFK)? 
3/72 10/72 10/73 11/75 11/76 
Economic policy 12 2 10 30 15 
German politics 22 59 20 27 37 
Ostpolitik 52 31 13 20 22 
International affairs in general, UN 11 7 7 12 17 
Middle East 1 0 30 4 1 
Energy problems 0 0 7 1 0 
Vietnam 1 0 3 1 
Watergate 0 0 7 3 2 
NATO, national security, Bundeswehr 0 0 1 0 0 
Others 0 2 4 
Note: Open-ended questions; percentages of responses for collapsed issue areas from up 
to three events per respondent 
FRG do so because of foreign threat, but that fear for the FRG as a whole 
does not affect private fears; only one-tenth of private fears are due to the 
threat of war. In other words, there is some threat of war, but that is for 
the state, not the individual, to worry about. 
Data on the level of information on national security and on the extent 
to which individuals follow these issues in the media would be very helpful 
as indicators of personal salience. Unfortunately, little recent material is 
available. During 1972 to 1976, SFK inquired five times what political 
events respondents remembered from the past twelve months. As is 
evident from Table 4.3, economics, German politics, and Ostpolitik 
commanded most attention (with 80 percent of responses or more). 
Problems of NATO, of national security, and of the Bundeswehr were 
outside people's attention screen. Events in international affairs in general 
were remembered to a lim.ited extent, but it took dramatic things such as 
the Middle East war and the oil embargo to push them to the foreground. 
Once these events were past, they soon disappeared from people's con-
sciousness. 
In the October 1979 "Verteidigungsklima" survey for the Federal 
Ministry of Defense, respondents were presented with eight items tapping 
their information on security affairs. What is NATO; what is the Warsaw 
Pact; who is secretary of defense; what are the three services of the 
Bundeswehr and how many soldiers does it have; what do SALT II and 
enlisted soldier mean; who would decide on the use of nuclear weapons on 
FRG territory in case of war? Although the multiple choices presented to 
the sample were almost ridiculously biased in favor of correct responses 
(e.g., Is NATO the economic council of the European Community, the 
Atomic Energy Commission, or the Western defense alliance?), only 15 
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percent could be classified as very well-informed (seven or more correct 
answers), 14 percent as well-informed (five or six correct answers). NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact were correctly identified by 91 percent and 89 
percent, respectively, the secretary of defense by 87 percent, the three 
services by 76 percent, SALT II by 59 percent. Seventy-two percent knew 
the meaning of enlisted soldier, 38 percent the size of the Bundeswehr, and 
only 35 percent chose the United States president as the authority for 
nuclear use. lt is not hard to imagine what results would have looked like 
with open-ended questions! 
In the same survey, people were also asked whether they were interested 
in TV or newspaper reporting on defense issues or the Bundeswehr. 
Forty-eight percent said so for TV, 43 percent for newspaper reporting. If 
these figures appear high, indicating the widespread desire to collect 
relevant information, it must be remembered that experience shows 
people will claim interest in anything, unless they are forced to set 
priorities-just as any political problem is at least "important" to many 
people. One has to set these figures against the actual level of information 
that has just been described and against the frequency of conversations 
about defense issues that was also surveyed. Only eight percent of 
respondents indicated them to be "permanent" or "frequent" topics for 
themselves, 26 percent reported "occasional" conversations on security, 
38 percent said they talked "seldom"; 26 percent "never" about these 
things. These figures seem to mirror much more closely actual personal 
concerns, and they are corroborated by Piß data from May 1981, when 22 
percent said they held "strong" interest in national security affairs, 43 
percent claimed "average" interest (whatever that may mean), and 32 
percent openly admitted little or no interest at all. 
This information is not very recent, of course, so one might argue that 
things would look much different today with all the debates on the NATO 
double-track decision and strategy. This does not seem tobe so, as we will 
see later in connection with the deployment of new missiles. Times that 
feel turbulent while you live through them often look quiet in retrospect. 
Table4.4 Which side is militarily superior in your opinion, NATO (West) or Warsaw 
Pact 1East)7 
lfD SOWI SOWI SOWI FGW FGW FGW 
3/73 12/77 10/79 2/80 5/81 5/82 5/83 
NATO 7 (9) 13 (17) 11 (13) 10 (12) 10 (10) 9 (9) 11 
Both equal 24 (30) 30 (39) 31 (37) 36 (42) 38 (38) 36 (36) 42 
Warsaw Pact 48 (61) 34 (44) 42 (50) 39 (46) 51 (52) 54 (55) 47 
OK.NA 21 23 16 15 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK (don't know), NA (not applicable) 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 115 
The years from 1972 to 1979 have not been all that dull in terms of NATO 
problems, arms control, and so on. Very many people did not notice these 
things then, and, judging from the salience readings in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, 
very many people may nowadays be only marginally aware of current 
discussions over security and defense and may attribute only limited 
importance to them, both personally and for the FRG as a whole. This will 
have to be remembered throughout the remainder of this report, as we 
may frequently be talking about judgments and attitudes that have little 
cognitive foundation and about which most respondents themselves do not 
feel very strongly. 
Images of the Soviet Union 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE 
Perceptions of the military balance between East and West have not 
undergone substantial changes over the 1970s. In May 1983, almost one-
half ofWest Germans saw the Warsaw Pact as militarily superior, about 40 
percent perceived both blocs as equally powerful, and only one-tenth of 
respondents ascribed military predominance to NATO (Table 4.4). 
This overall picture has been broken down by Zoll (1982,53) for 1979/ 
1980 evaluations of various components of the total balance. Most respon-
dents saw the Warsaw Pact as superior in regard to numbers of military 
personnel and of weapons. A majority of Germans viewed both sides to be 
equal in terms of morale and combat readiness of soldiers, defense 
willingness of the populations, and training of troops. NATO was judged 
superior only in quality of weapons. Zoll's analysis demonstrates beyond 
reasonable doubt that the global evaluations of the East-West military 
balance in Table 4.4 mirror perceptions of numerical conventional force 
ratios. 
The pessimistic assessment of Western military strength vis-a-vis the 
East in the FRG is, moreover, strongly associated with a secular trend of 
decreasing belief in the long-run predominance of the United States 
against the USSR (see Table 4.5). When asked in 1953, which of the two 
superpowers would be more powerful "in SO years" (for all practical 
purposes a survey synonym for "in the long-range future"), almost one-
half of West Germans gave no response; of those who did, almost two-
thirds opted for the United States. By the end of the 1960s, the level of no 
response had gone down considerably, and responses divided evenly 
between "United States," "both equal," and "USSR." By the mid-1970s, 
uncertainty on this issue bad dropped further, the USSR being predicted 
as more powerful by half of those giving meaningful responses, the United 
States being chosen by less than one-fifth. One cannot but conclude that 
Western military inferiority is perceived in the FRG as an existing 
condition of national security that will remain and probably become even 
more accentuated over the years because of a continuing realignment in 
the superpower military balance. 
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This "fatalistic" projection of the future does not imply, however, that 
Eastern military superiority is regarded as harmless or as easily accept-
able. In the September 1982 Atlantic Institute survey, the "Soviet military 
buildup" was chosen as being among the factors contributing to current 
international tensions by 55 percent of West Germans (21 percent of total 
choices). In May 1981 (according to a PIB survey), only eight percent of 
West Germans found it acceptable to live with Eastern military superior-
ity, 71 percent advocated military equilibrium, and 16 percent called for 
Western superiority. On the other band, in the Atlantic Institute study, 
the salience of the East-West balance was not rated outstandingly high. 
When asked which of seven issues were most important to the future 
security of Western countries, 53 percent of Germans chose U .S.-Euro-
pean cooperation; the East-West military balance, European economic 
cooperation, continued dialogue with the USSR, and arms control negoti-
ations each were mentioned by percentages in the mid-30s; Western 
European defense collaboration and better relations with the Third World 
were referred to by only 26 percent and 21 percent, respectively. 
Even if it may appear so at first glance, there really is little contradiction 
between these findings. The Piß question evokes notions of some kind of 
ideal world in which parity naturally would prevail, as it does not require 
respondents to endorse specific efforts or sacrifices for parity. Who would 
like to accept inferiority in an abstract sense? But who would like to cfo 
something about it? Inferiority of the West is perceived as a fact of life, it is 
perceived as here to stay, it is perceived as increasing international 
tension. But reducing the Eastern military edge in order to provide greater 
security is not more important than detente and arms control; it is less 
important than good transatlantic relations. The extent to which military 
inferiority is regarded as unpleasant, but not as of vital importance, 
certainly is related to the extent to which it is seen to constitute an 
imminent threat-to which we next turn. 
THE MILITARY THREAT 
Assessments of the military threat to the FRG over the 1970s appear to 
have changed as little as perceptions of the military balance. lf one 
compares the 1981 to the 1969 or 1971 data in Table 4.6, each shows that 
about one-third of West Germans have considered the USSR and the 
Warsaw Pact as a military threat, and about two-thirds have not. Dramatic 
changes, however, have taken place over the 1950s and 1960s. In 1952, 
more than 80 percent thought the East to constitute a threat, a figure that 
was down to one half by the mid-1960s and then increased sizeably after 
the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. This event did not 
have lasting effects, and the subsequent "detente level'' of relatively low 
threat perception only recently seems to have increased somewhat, as is 
shown by data from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (FGW) of May 1982 and 
May 1983. This appears to conform to the increase in perceptions of 
. Warsaw Pact superiority in the early 1980s (Table 4.4) and has been 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 117 
Table 4.5 Who is going tobe more powerful in 50 years, United States or USSR (lfD)? 
8/53 5/66 1/69 3/73 5/75 
US 32 (62) 25 (43) 21 (34) 14 (21} 13 (18) 
Both equal 9 (17) 16 (25) 21 (34) 21 (31) 22 (31) 
USSR 11 (21} 21 (32) 20 (32) 32 (48) 37 (51) 
DK, NA 48 35 38 33 28 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
foreshadowed by FGW data from September 1980 on respondents' evalua-
tions of the change in threat over the past five years. At that time, 48 
percent said the military threat to the FRG had grown, 43 percent said it 
had remained the same, and only eight percent believed it had decreased. 
Table 4.6 illustrates another feature, however, that should be a very 
strong warning against careless interpretation of survey findings on threat 
perceptions. The SOWI data from 1979 and 1980 clearly demonstrate an 
impressive effect of survey instruments, of question wording. Unlike HD 
and FGW, SOWI provided an intermediate category of "not so serious 
threat" and accentuated the extreme category by calling it "serious 
threat." The consequences are obvious: the level of no response goes down 
just as the extreme categories of "serious threat" and "no threat" do; the 
ambiguous category "not so serious threat" at the same time contains 
almost one half of meaningful responses. If this category is omitted, these 
respondents are scattered all over the other three categories. lf it is 
included, on the other hand, it is most likely a very attractive response 
with which many people feel comfortable, especially if they don't think or 
know a lot about a threat from the East. This sizeable instrument effect in 
security-related items indicates the difficulty of assessing precisely the 
extent to which Germans currently feel threatened by the East. The 
perception of threat is, however, anything but overwhelming. 
Another reasonable measure of comparatively low threat perception in 
the FRG is available from the October 1979 Verteidigungsklima survey 
performed for the Federal Ministry of Defense. Respondents were pre-
sented with four explanations of Soviet armaments and required to 
indicate agreement or disagreement. The most popular explanation (80 
percent agreement) was that Soviet military power was necessary to hold 
the Warsaw Pact together: 76 percent agreed that the Soviet Union wanted 
to be prepared against attacks, 46 percent agreed that Soviet armaments 
were caused by the feeling of being threatened by the West. The lowest 
share of respondents ( 42 percent) accepted the view that the Soviet 
military buildup is due to aggressive intentions. The public obviously does 
not infer intentions from the capabilities it perceives. 
Table 4.6: Do you think that the USSR (Eastl is a threat to us or don't you think so? 
lfD lfD lfD lfD lfD lfD SOWI SOWI FGW FGW FGW 
7/52 3/58 11/64 11/68 9/69 4/71 2/80 5/81 5/81 5/82 5/83 
Serious threat 66(81) 51(65) 39(51) 54(63) 32(37) 28(38) 10(12) 14(16) 36(37) 44(44) 44(47) 
Not so serious threat 41(48) 42(47) 
No threat 15(19) 27(35) 37(491 32(37) 55(63) 46(62) 35(44) 33(37) 62(63) 55(56) 49(53) 
DK,NA 19 22 24 14 13 26 14 11 2 1 8 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
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RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION 
Comparatively little recent survey evidence is available on perceptions of 
general East-West relations. According to an FGW survey of October 
1981, 46 percent of West Germans considered relations between the FRG 
and the USSR tobe good, and 54 percent described them as bad. This 
conforms closely to previous expectations. In December 1977, October 
1979, and February 1980, SOWI surveyed expectations of possible future 
changes in East-West relations. In 1977, 60 percent of respondents 
expected no change, the remaining responses were divided equally be-
tween improvement and deterioration. In October 1979, 52 percent 
expected no change, 32 percent saw future improvements, and only 16 
percent predicted worse relations. In early 1980, however, after the 
December 1979 decision of NATO and after Afghanistan and the Iranian 
hostage crisis, 47 percent expected no change, 41 percent, deterioration; 
and only 12 percent, improvements of relations. 
This is, of course, consistent with the data presented above. In the 
beginning of the 1980s, the strains in East-West relations show up in West 
German public opinion. General relations with the East are evaluated as 
bad and as getting worse, there are more references to military threat and 
to Warsaw Pact superiority. A large majority of Germans in fact agrees as 
to what should be done about this. In October 1981, 56 percent were in 
favor of extending relations between the FRG and the USSR, 29 percent 
believed they should stay the same, and only 16 percent said they should 
be reduced. For a plurality of Germans the most important aspect of 
relations with the East is the preservation of peace ( 41 percent, according 
to a FGW survey of October 1981 ). Economic collaboration follows closely 
as the most important aspect for 36 percent of respondents. Human rights 
in the Eastern countries (16 percent), sports (five percent), and cultural 
exchange (two percent) are the rnost important aspects for minorities only. 
With this list of priorities, extending and improving relations with the 
USSR is a strategy that seems obvious to many Germans. Their detente-
mindedness vis-a-vis the East also clearly shows in CC data from February 
1982, when 67 percent-and 28 percent partially-agreed that detente 
should be continued in spite of some setbacks. In the same study, only 21 
percent agreed ( 42 percent partially) that as a result of the events in Poland 
economic aid to the East should be discontinued; agreement with the 
notion that increasing economic ties to the East could be dangerous was 
even lower. 
GOODWILL AND COOPERATION 
lt is significant to note that this desire is not paralleled by a very optimistic 
view of the Soviet Union. The USSR is seen as militarily superior by a 
rnajority of Germans who also doubt her goodwill to come to acceptable 
terms with the West. This judgment has becorne less frequent over the 
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Table 4.7 Does the USSR have the goodwill to come to terms with the West (lfD)7 
4/59 4/65 4/66 4/70 6/71 7/74 2/77 1/80 7/81 
Yes 17(23) 23(29) 26(33) 33(42) 34(40) 29(35) 27(31) 16(19) 36(43) 
No 57(77) 56(71) 54(67) 46(58) 50(60) 55(65) 60(69) 70(81) 48(57) 
OK.NA 26 21 20 21 16 16 13 14 16 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
1960s, but over the 1970s still more than 60 percent of respondents have 
regularly expressed such doubts (Table 4.7). In January 1980, confidence 
in Soviet goodwill even reached an extremely low point with 19 percent of 
respondents. By July 1981, considerable recovery seems to have taken 
place, even though two-thirds of respondents in an October 1981 FGW 
survey said they would not expect Soviet reliability as a business partner in 
case of political crisis. 
Considerable suspicion vis-a-vis the USSR is also obvious in CC and 
PIB surveys from February 1982 and May 1982, respectively. In the first 
study, SO percent of respondents agreed (41 percent partially) that Soviet 
policies are a threat to peace. In the second survey, 73 percent attributed 
the motive of striving for military superiority to the USSR (SO percent to 
the United States); 18 percent said the Soviet Union was aiming at 
equilibrium (42 percent for the United States); and only tiny fractions held 
that either superpower was ready to accept inferiority. Sixty-five percent 
agreed that the USSR was trying to split the FRG apart from the West, 
and 77 percent said the Soviet Union had not forsaken her goal of 
worldwide revolution. At the same time, however, the image of the Soviet 
Union was not all black and white: 64 percent attributed to the USSR 
some concern about international reputation and cooperation, and even 80 
percent held her to be interested in good economic relations with the 
West. This is by no means a contradiction: The USSR is seen as willing to 
Table 4.8 Relations between the FRG and the USSR and Soviet reliability 
(FGW 10/81) 
Relations 
should be 
Extended 
Kept the same 
Reduced 
Relations are 
Good Bad 
63 
30 
7 
50 
27 
23 
Soviets are reliable 
as business partners in 
case of political crisis 
Yes No 
75 
17 
7 
46 
34 
20 
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cooperate for purely selfish (economic) reasons, but her underlying long-
range motives and policies are essentially judged as rather sinister by 
sizeable majorities. 
lt is probably not overstretching the available data if one concludes that 
most out of the majority of West Germans who think East-West relations 
to be bad would blame the East for this state of affairs. Likewise it seems 
possible to summarize that images of the Soviet Union held in the FRG 
have been fairly stable since the early l 97Gs, but subject to some rapid 
shifts due to spectacular international events such as the invasions in 
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the effects of which have tended to fade 
away after some time. 
INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN ITEMS 
One would expect perception of a Soviet military threat to be a function of 
the perception of the military balance, and this is indeed the case to a 
significant degree. In May 1981 (FGW) 37 percent of those surveyed feit 
the East to be militarily threatening. Among those who viewed both sides 
as equally strong, the figure was 25 percent, only 20 percent among those 
who perceived Western military superiority, but 49 percent of thos.e who 
evaluated the East as stronger. Similarly, in October 1979 (BMV) 20 
percent of those who said the Warsaw Pact bad increased its armaments 
evaluated the military threat to the FRG as high, whereas only seven 
percent of those who viewed Warsaw Pact armaments as having remained 
the same shared this judgment. In the same survey, 17 percent (23 
percent) of those who attributed defensive (offensive) intentions to East-
ern armament increases evaluated the military threat as high. These latter 
two associations are clearly visible but not very strong. 
Threat perception has marked effects on the perceptions of East-West 
relations. Also in October 1979, of those who saw the military threat as 
high 77 percent evaluated East-West relations as rather hostile, 16 percent 
as in between, and only five percent as rather friendly. Among those with 
low threat perceptions the figures were 20, 61, and 16 percent, respec-
tively. In addition, 41 percent of respondents in the first group expected 
relations to deteriorate, 37 percent expected them to stay the same, and 
only 11 percent projected improvements. In the lauer group these per-
centages were 12, 54, and 18 percent. 
Judgments on East-West relations also are strongly infiuenced by 
perceptions of Soviet rdiability. In October 1981 (FGW) 64 percent of 
those respondents who said one could rely on the Soviet Union as a 
business partner in case of political crisis evaluated relations between the 
FRG and the Soviet Union as good, the same percentage of those 
disagreeing on Soviet reliability said relations were bad. Evaluations of 
East-West relations and of Soviet reliability, in turn, are both associated 
with attitudes on whether FRG-USSR relations should be extended or 
reduced (Table 4.8). 
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Table 4.9 Do you think we have to expect another World War or do you think nobody 
will take that risk (lfDI? 
9/61 1/63 2/64 2/65 6/67 12/75 9/83 
Have to expect 46(51) 42(461 35(38) 41(46) 38(41) 29(32) 24(36) 
World War 
No 45(49) 49(54) 56(62) 48(54) 54(59) 63(68) 42(64) 
DK,NA 9 9 9 11 8 8 34 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
In sum, separate indicators of images of the Soviet Union are consist-
ently interrelated without any apparent contradictions in overall public 
opinion. However, associations are not sufficiently strong to claitn a very 
tight pattern of attitudes at the individual level where numerous nonobvi-
ous combinations of judgments occur. In May 1981, for example, roughly 
one-fourth of total respondents recorded a military edge in favor of the 
East and, at the same time, said they saw no military threat. 
Images of Security 
FEAROFWAR 
The fear of another World War in the FRG shows a secular downward 
trend from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s. In December 1975 more than 
two-thirds of respondents agreed that nobody would take the risk of 
another World War (Table 4.9). This time series by IfD is continued by 
SOWI data from 1977 to 1980, in which more than 80 percent said that the 
threat of East-West war in Europe was "rather limited" (Table 4.10). 
These two sets of data are, of course, not directly comparable. SOWI by 
its choice of response categories invited respondents to select "rather 
limited threat of war" as a highly ambiguous reply. The stitnuli of "World 
War" vs. "East-West war in Europe" also may have evoked very different 
fears. In view of the different question wording, it is virtually impossible 
to judge whether the discrepancies between Tables 4.9 and 4.10 are due to 
instrument effects or whether there is, in fact, a paradox in public opinion 
in the FRG: where military conflict in Europe is seen as less likely than 
World War, in other words where the global situation is perceived as more 
dangerous but, surprisingly, largely decoupled from the threat of war in 
Europe. 
Consistent with what has been said on perceptions of threat and of the 
military balance, the perception of the threat of war also seems to have 
grown in the early 1980s. Direct measurements are not available, but in 
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Table 4.10 ls the threat of war between East and West in Europe rather great or rather 
limited (SOWI)? 
12/77 10/79 2/80 
Rather great 11 (13) 9(11) 14(16) 
Rather limited 74(87) 73(89) 72(84) 
DK, NA 15 18 14 
Note: In brackets: percentages without DK, NA 
October 1981 and May 1982 and 1983 FGW asked whether peace in 
Europe had become more or less secure over the past year (Table 4.11). In 
the first survey, 27 percent of the sample replied that nothing had 
changed, and 67 percent said that peace had become less secure. In the 
second and third surveys, the corresponding figures were 39 percent (56) 
and 57 percent (38), respectively. There is no straightforward interpreta-
tion of the sizeable increase of "no change" responses from 1981 to 1983, 
the parallel decline of perceptions of peace having become less secure over 
the past year. Maybe many people in 1983 believed that the stability of 
peace bad not changed because they thought it had deteriorated so much 
previously. On the other hand, this item may have tapped judgments of 
the current situation rather than of the dynamics of the threat, indicating 
that more alarmist threat perceptions of 1981and1982 had given way to 
more optimistic attitudes. 
However this may be, if one sees peace as more in jeopardy than earlier 
then logically war is more threatening. Interestingly, this seems to result 
from a rather general impression of the overall international situation and 
does not stem from a belief that particular crises would escalate into war. 
In January 1980, when FGW asked whether respondents believed the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would lead to superpower war, 78 percent 
said they did not think so. 
Table 4.11 Has peace in Europe over the past year become more or less secure, or hes 
nothing changed (FGW)? 
10/81 5/82 5/83 
More secure 6 3 6 
Nothing changed 27 39 56 
Less secure 67 57 38 
DK,NA 0 0 
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Table4.12 In case of aggression by the East, do you think defense - together with the 
allies - would be possible or not? 
lfD lfD lfD SOWI lfD SOWI SOWI BMV lfD 
9/60 9/71 3/76 12/77 9/79 10/79 2/80 6/80 5/81 
Oefense 19(34) 27(42) 26(48) 38(40) 27(47) 33(41) 33(38) 28(35) 25(39) 
possible 
Oefense 46(48) 34(42) 40(47) 36(46) 
question-
able 
Oefense 37(66) 37(58) 28(52) 12(13) 31(53) 14(17) 13(15) 14(18) 41(61) 
impossible 
OK.NA 44 36 46 5 42 19 14 21 34 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
FEASIBILITY OF DEFENSE 
Judgments whether the West could defend itself against aggression by the 
Bast illustrate some of the points that have been made in the section on 
salience of national security (Table 4.12). How are people to know? If one 
looks at the IfD data one gets the impression that between one-third and 
almost one-half of respondents believe they cannot evaluate this, and 
among the others there is a solid majority rejecting the feasibility of 
defense all over the 1970s. The SOWI data tell a much different story. 
"No responses" are much less frequent, just as are responses in the two 
unambiguous categories. Does this mean that most people think they can 
say anything meaningful on this question, and that most view the feasibil-
ity of defense as somewhere between absolute certainty and absolute 
impossibility? Probably not. The ambiguous "defense is questionable" 
category attracts respondents who either feel uncomfortable with the two 
extreme positions or who do not know for sure but do not want to say so 
(maybe to please the interviewer). 
This is not to argue that there may be a better or "correct" instrument, 
but only to point out again the problem of instrument effects. Even more 
than with threat perception, these seem to occur when one polls images of 
hypothetical futures in issue areas that are not very salient to respondents 
and on which their information is not terribly good. From a substantive 
point of view, it does not make sense to have, at almost the same time, an 
absolute majority or only between 10 percent and 20 percent of meaning-
ful responses claiming impossibility of defense, especially if we have no 
yardstick by which to assess what is "correct." 
Evaluation of defensive capability seems to be particularly subject to 
such effects of question wording, as is illustrated by another interesting 
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Table 4.13 What is more important, defending democracy - even if this involves a 
nuclear war - or avoiding war - even if this means living under a 
communist government (lfDI? 
5/55 4/56 3/59 7/60 12/75 3/76 2/79 5/81 7/81 
Defending 33(48) 35(51) 32(49) 30(44) 25(34) 28(35) 23(31) 27(36) 30(40) 
democracy 
Avoiding 36(52) 34(49) 33(51) 38(56) 49(66) 52(65) 52(69) 48(64) 45(60) 
war 
DK, NA 31 31 35 32 26 20 25 25 25 
Note: In brackets: percentages without DK, NA 
example from the early 1970s. In April 1971, IfD inquired whether 
respondents thought the fighting power of the Bundeswehr to have 
decreased over the past couple of years. In a split-half sample design, the 
time-horizon for comparison for half of the respondents was defined as 
"since Helmut Schmidt has been Secretary of Defense." Without mention 
of Schmidt, 47 percent said the fighting power of the Bundeswehr bad 
gone down, in the other subsample only 22 percent agreed. If an issue is so 
elusive, remote, and hypothetical, respondents will jump to the clues they 
are given. 
ACCEPTANCE OF DEFENSE 
Since the 1950s, IfD has been intermittently posing a "red or dead" 
question, asking respondents to choose between defending democracy 
(even if this would involve nuclear war) and avoiding war (even if this 
would mean living under a communist regime) (Table 4.13). From 20 to 
35 percent of samples have always refused this choice. Among nonrefusers 
both alternatives were about equally popular in the 1950s, but over the 
1970s, the scales were permanently in favor of avoiding war (60 percent 
and more). As both options are heavily "loaded" with affective content 
("nuclear war" vs. "communist regime"), it is very hard to interpret this 
item in terms of the degree to which different modes of a national security 
policy based upon military defense are accepted or tolerated in West 
German public opinion. All one can teil with some confidence is that there 
have been no major changes in recent years in the degree to which war 
avoidance dominates preferences, although military defense-at the price 
of nuclear war-seems to be considered somewhat more inevitable in the 
early 1980s, conforming to perceptions of threar, the military balance, and 
the <langer of war. 
A far better insight into the complexities of the acceptance of military 
defense in public opinion is gained from three survey items employed by 
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SOWI in 1977, 1979, and 1980. Respondents were asked to indicate 
whether or not the FRG should militarily resist an attack on its territory, 
whether or not the FRG should be rnilitarily defended against attack if war 
would be primarily fought on her territory, whether or not she should be 
militarily defended against attack if this would involve using nuclear 
weapons on her territory. Findings from all three points in time do not 
differ much. About one-fifth of respondents gave no reply. Of the others, 
about three quarters advocated military defense by the FRG against 
attack. This dropped to around 60 percent if fighting would occur mainly 
on FRG territory, and only about one-fifth supported defense if it 
involved nuclear war on FRG territory. 
This poses the question of what the "red or dead" item or the SOWI 
instruments actually measure. There seems tobe an enormous effect of 
question wording. Resisting foreign attack, if isolated from specific sce-
narios, appears as something many people can agree upon as a necessary 
course of action. This consensus falters if military resistance is to take 
place predominantly "at home." If it would involve nuclear war, the 
majority opts against military defense, and if nuclear war would occur "at 
home," the majority against military defense is even slightly stronger than 
the majority for military resistance as a general principle. 
There are various possible interpretations of this pattern of public 
opinion. A majority of people, for instance, may accept conventional 
military forces in a defensive role-with very little enthusiasm for fighting 
on FRG territory, of course-but might refuse to conceive of a war-
fighting role for nuclear weapons, which would be exclusively seen as 
deterrent devices. Their use in case of conflict, a breakdown of deterrence, 
would make rnilitary resistance unattractive and unacceptable. 
This interpretation may, however, assume too much sophistication on 
the part of the mass public. There may in fact be no elaborate thinking on 
the acceptability of various types of defensive military action. Survey 
stimuli alone may create the observed complexity. People may in general 
agree with "defense" against attack, because the term carries positive 
connotations. Their agreement may dwindle simply to the extent that 
"defense" is connected to more and more unpleasant additional informa-
tion. There may be other interpretations as weil, but the two outlined here 
suffice to demonstrate the possibility for wildly diverging conclusions. The 
first interpretation would teil us that West German public opinion accepts 
conventional defense and nuclear deterrence but not nuclear war as a 
means of defense. The latter interpretation would tell us that we simply 
know very little about the acceptance of military defense in the FRG and 
that what we elicit from respondents to a significant degree depends on the 
stimuli used. As realistic scenarios for employing military force for 
countering aggression against the FRG all involve sufficiently unappealing 
details, military defense is thus likely to be rejected as soon as one 
provides those details. Without them it will be endorsed. 
lt is not possible here to demonstrate which interpretation is closer to 
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reality. What this clearly does demonstrate is the difficulty one has in 
arriving at any meaningful conclusions on the acceptance of defense in the 
FRG from available survey data. A further question that cannot be 
pursued here is the extent to which acceptance of military defense by 
public opinion actually would even matter in case of confilct. 
Another illustration of the complexity of public acceptance of.military 
defense comes from Piß and CC data from May 1981 and February 1982. 
CC surveyed agreement with various strategies to preserve peace. For the 
sake of this goal, only five percent of respondents were willing to termi-
nate German membership in NATO "under all circumstances" (16 per-
cent, "maybe," 78 percent, "never"). Also a mere five percent (15, 
"maybe") said they would accept living in a socialist country, 33 percent 
(51, "maybe") would tolerate a lower Standard of living; and 39 percent 
(38, "maybe") claimed to be willing to accept efforts to maintain the 
military balance, even by Western buildup if it had tobe. This reads like 
rather solid support for military defense. However, in the same study, 
only ten percent (26 "maybe") accepted risks to their own lives in order to 
preserve peace, and57 preferred unilateral disarmament or arms control 
negotiations without Western INF deployment over increases of Western 
military power. The May 1981 Piß study shows, moreover, that detente 
was evaluated as far more important (90 percent) than concrete measures 
to increase Western defensive capacity, like the issue of INF deployment 
(56 percent, "important"). Again, the conclusion is that military defense 
is endorsed by public opinion much more easily as an abstract principle 
than in its burdensome practice, and that it has no chance if it is up against 
more "civilized" concepts such as negotiations and detente. 
DEFENSE SPENDING 
Believing that the FRG should be defended militarily against foreign 
attack does not make people fond of military spending. In an October 
1980 FGW survey, one-fifth of respondents avoided commenting on the 
size of the defense budget; of the remainder, 46 percent said it was just 
right, ten percent said it was too low, and 44 percent too high. Two more 
recent surveys from February and November 1982 yielded even less 
support for defense spending (Table 4.14), with far more than half of 
responses in favor of moderate to strong reductions. 
In an October 1979 survey by SOWI only one-tenth of the sample 
showed a willingness to pay a special tax for maintaining the fighting 
power of the Bundeswehr. When asked in the same study where the 
government could make expenditure cuts for that purpose, only foreign 
aid appeared as a tolerable source of additional revenues to more than 50 
percent of respondents. These results were confirmed by an FGW survey 
of April 1981 in which respondents were asked for their opinion about 
where government spending should be reduced: 61 percent called for cuts 
in government salaries, 54 percent in defense, 53 percent in foreign aid, 31 
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Table 4.14 Self-placement on seven-point scale on size of defense budget 
Defense budget should be 
strongly strongly 
reduced increased 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK,NA 
ZA 1160 2/82 18(20) 14(15) 18(20) 26(28) 10(11) 4(4) 2(2) 6 
ABI* 12/82 33(34) 13(14) 16(17) 23(24) 6 (6) 3(3) 2(2) 4 
Note: In brackets: percentages without DK, NA 
*Survey conducted for Arnold-Bergstraesser-lnstitut, Freiburg im Breisgau 
percent in subsidies to agriculture, 23 percent in social services and 
security, 19 percent in science and research. This ranking was very closely 
reproduced by a February 1982 CC study, and it obviously corresponds to 
evaluations of the salience of national security for individuals and for the 
country. lt is not among the top priorities, so the volume of military 
outlays is viewed very critically. 
THE BUNDESWEHR 
Curiously, there are few recent survey findings on mass attitudes vis-a-vis 
the Bundeswehr. What is available supports what has just been said on the 
connection between the low salience of national security and the desire to 
see military spending reduced. 
In three SOWI surveys from 1977 to 1980 people were required to 
evaluate the importance of the Bundeswehr for the FRG (Table 4.15). 
That fewer than ten percent described it as "unimportant" in all three 
studies should not be read as an indication of widespread enthusiasm 
about the armed forces. The question wording is a good example of the 
point made earlier: if people are asked for judgments on importance, 
almost everything tends to be important or even very important to large 
majorities, as they do not have to make trade-offs. As soon as they are 
forced to do so (e.g. via spending alternatives), more meaningful ranking 
according to salience emerges, as could be seen in the previous section. 
Careful analysis of the data in Table 4.15 also leads to a confirmation of 
our earlier analysis. When one compares the percentages of "very impor-
tant" responses to top priority items in Table 4.2, the differences are 
striking; the lauer received percentages of 70 percent up to 90 percent or 
more. One can thus assume that the concentration in Table 4.15 of 
responses in the "important" category shows that the importance of the 
Bundeswehr for the FRG was in fact not evaluated as particularly high by 
respondents in these studies. Had there been a whole battery of items for 
comparison, this would have been immediately obvious. But even so this 
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Table 4.15 How important do you consider the Bundeswehr tobe for our country? 
SOWI SOWI SOWI BMV 
12/77 10/79 2/80 6/80 
Very important 22(22) 25(27) 34(36) 32(36) 
lmportant 52(53) 45(49) 45(47) 43(48) 
Neither/nor 18(18) 14(15) 11(12) 9(10) 
Unimportant 7 (7) 8 (9) 6 (6) 6 (7) 
OK, NA 2 8 5 10 
Note: In brackets: percentages wlthout OK, NA 
interpretation is clearly in line with previous comments: the armed forces 
are not seen as extremely important for the country, so it is logical to 
perceive part of the financial burden they constitute as dispensable. 
On the surface, one can suspect a paradox in the juxtaposition of these 
attitudes toward the Bundeswehr with the high endorsement of military 
defense against foreign attack. Various explanations can be offered. First, 
if the threat is perceived as low, the Bundeswehr can be less important in 
spite of the necessity to resist militarily when attacked. Second, plausible 
scenarios for military defense in which the Bundeswehr could play a 
meaningful role may not be perceived. Finally, the whole issue of security, 
defense, and of the role of the Bundeswehr in it may simply be so remote 
and low in salience that attitudinal inconsistencies do not matter. 
THE PEACE MOVEMENT 
There are not very many data on attitudes toward the peace movement in 
the Federal Republic. A May 1983 survey by FGW does provide, how-
ever, some recent data. lt was evaluated as "necessary" by 47 percent of 
the sample, as "superfluous" by 24 percent, and as "detrimental" by seven 
percent. Twenty-three percent said they did not care about it. Interviewed 
one month later by FGW on what actions out of a list of five they would 
participate if new missiles were to be deployed in the area where they 
lived, petitions were chosen by 60 percent, demonstrations by 28 percent, 
blockades of military installations by seven percent, illegal demonstrations 
by six percent, and, finally, damaging military facilities by one percent of 
respondents. When asked about the proximity of the peace movement to 
political parties in October 1981 (FGW), nine percent of respondents 
avoided any judgment and 38 percent saw no linkages between parties and 
the peace movement. Fourteen percent said it was closest to the Social 
Democrats, 12 percent to the Greens, and four percent saw it equally close 
to both these parties. Four percent regarded the peace movement as 
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closest to the Christian Democrats, three percent to the Communists, and 
one percent to the Liberals. Three percent responded that the peace 
movement was equally affiliated with all parties, and 11 percent saw it 
closest to other than the listed parties (there are no other parties). 
These numbers are hard to interpret. One can say with some confi-
dence, however, that the figures on the necessity of the peace movement 
and on possible participation in demonstrations are greatly inßated. The 
goal of the movement implied by its name draws excess sympathies--just 
as with environmentalists--and the indication of a general willingness to 
become active does not commit respondents in any way. On the partisan 
proximity of the movement there is considerable insecurity: fewer than 40 
percent of respondents identify it with existing parties. This corresponds, 
of course, to the very heterogeneous nature of the peace movement in the 
FRG. 
INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN ITEMS 
In the second section of this chapter, salience of national security items in 
the FRG has been dealt with separately, because of the critical role of this 
variable. For the sake of convenience, we will from now on treat salience 
as a component of images of security, as it logically is. Therefore, within 
this subsection we will first look at the interrelations among indicators of 
interest, information, and salience of national security, then at their 
associations with other measurements pertinent to this duster. In October 
1979 (BMV), 24 percent of those who named national security as a top-
priority political goal evaluated the Bundeswehr as "very important," 62 
percent as "important." Among the overwhelming majority (86 percent), 
who gave low salience to national security, the corresponding numbers 
were 17 and 60 percent. This is not much of a difference, so judgments on 
the importance of the armed forces are not to a significant degree 
determined by the perceived salience of security affairs. 
The association between interest in media reports on national security 
and the level of knowledge of these matters is somewhat closer. In the 
same survey, 22 percent of those who said they were interested in such 
reports were very well-informed and 15 percent weil informed. For those 
without interest these figures were only ten and 12 percent; 61 as opposed 
to 78 percent bad a low level of information. Table 4.16 reveals quite 
clearly, moreover, that perceived salience of national security is much 
more closely related to interest than to level of information. Those who 
view national security and the armed forces as more importaiit tend to be 
only somewhat better informed, but they are much more interested and 
have a lot more conversations on security issues. The causal structure 
seems to be like this: personal salience of national security has a strong 
direct eff ect on interest and little direct eff ect upon inf ormation. Only if 
high personal salience and personal interest coincide is the level of 
information increased significantly. 
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Table 4.16 Salience of national security, level of information, and interest 
(BMV 10/79) 
Top priority of Armed forces 
national security Very Less 
Yes No lmportant lmportant lmportant 
1 nformation on defense 
Very good 18 12 18 14 16 
Good 17 13 13 15 11 
Deficient 66 73 67 73 71 
Correct responses on 33 35 40 34 35 
who is to authorize use 
of nuclear weapons 
1 nterest in media reports 
on defense 
Yes 50 34 54 36 20 
No 50 66 46 64 80 
Conversations on defense 
Often 14 8 19 7 5 
Occasionally 34 24 30 28 18 
Seldom 31 40 33 41 37 
Never 21 28 18 24 40 
Unlike the fear of war, for which no systematic relations could be 
detected, evaluations of the feasibility and acceptability of military defense 
are in fact associated with attitudes toward the armed forces and with 
information and interest. This is not the case, however, for the perceived 
salience of national security. Table 4.17 shows what these associations look 
like: those who hold the Bundeswehr to be very important, or have more 
information, or are more interested in security issues tend to entertain 
stronger beliefs that the FRG could be defended militarily and tend to be 
somewhat more willing actually to defend the country, even if presented 
with very unattractive scenarios. Most of these intergroup differences are 
by no means dramatic, however. 
As to defense spending, there is some evidence from February 1982 (ZA 
1160) that high perceived salience of national security leads to more 
favorable attitudes vis-a-vis military expenditures. For those respondents 
who said that strong defense was their personally most important political 
concern, the average position on a seven-point scale on military expendi-
tures ranging from "strong reduction" (1) to "strong increases" (7) was 4.1 
(i.e., almost exactly in the center indeterminate category). All other 
respondents had an average score of 3.1, which illustrates the widespread 
desire to reduce military expenditures that has been described above. 
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Table 4.17 lmportance of armed forces, information, interest, and feasibility and 
acceptance of military defense (BMV 10/79) 
FRG should be defended militarily 
FRG could if war if nuclear 
be defended on FRG war on 
militarily in general soil FRG soil 
Bundeswehr is 
Very important 47 79 77 41 
lmportant 38 58 58 22 
Less important 21 27 25 11 
Information on defense 
Very good 41 67 62 27 
Good 32 54 60 21 
Deficient 36 53 52 22 
lnterest in media 
reports on defense 
Yes 42 68 62 27 
No 33 48 50 21 
Note: Percentages of agreement with column stimulus within row categories 
Finally, there are some recent data (FGW 5/83) on the relationship 
between perceptions of the stability of peace and attitudes toward the 
peace movement. lt is less popular (41 percent, "necessary") among those 
who see no recent change in the security of peace. These respondents also 
are most "indifferent" (28 percent, 25 percent "superfl.uous", six percent, 
"detrimental") about the peace movement. lf peace is seen as having 
become less secure (almost no respondents called it more secure), the 
peace movement tends to be evaluated far more positively (57 percent, 
"necessary"); "indifference" (17 percent) and mild or strong rejections (20 
and six percent, respectively) are less frequent. Perceptions of the stability 
of peace also have some impact on the inclination to participate in peace 
movement activities that is higher for those who see less security. 
Images of Deterrence 
ACCEPTANCE OF DETERRENCE AND OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
We have seen that attitudes toward military defense in the FRG are very 
ambiguous. lt is endorsed in principle, but not in practice. Therefore it 
does not come as a surprise that preventing foreign attack by deterrence 
receives solid support (Table4.18). From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s 
about 70 percent of those who replied considered deterrence to be the best 
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Table 4.18 Do you agree that an attack by the East can best be prevented by 
deterrence, if the West has sufficient armaments (lfD)? 
2/76 1/78 9/79 3/81 7/81 
Agree 58(72) 58(73) 55(72) 50{67) 53(71) 
Disagree 23(28) 22(27) 21(28) 25(33) 22{29) 
DK, NA 19 20 24 25 25 
Note: In brackets: percentages without DK, NA 
12/81 
50(68) 
24(32) 
26 
way to prevent aggression. Unfortunately, however, the lfD instrument is 
both insufficiently differentiated and actually confusing. The reference to 
"sufficient armaments" makes it hard to decide whether nuclear deter-
rence ("by punishment") or deterrence by conventional parity or suffi-
ciency ("by denial") is being evaluated by respondents. However, if one 
bears in mind our earlier findings, it seems plausible that for most 
respondents the key term here will be "deterrence," and not "sufficient 
armaments." 
The support by the majority of West Germans for preventing war 
through deterrence is for "pure deterrence," however, and does not 
include acceptance of the complex notion that one must have a capability 
of fighting a war in order actually to prevent fighting. This is the 
conclusion one must draw from comparing Table 4.18 with the previously 
demonstrated absence of widespread support for actually defending the 
FRG. lt would require very sophisticated measuring devices--that may 
easily overtax most respondents' level of information-to assess more 
precisely the degree of acceptance of various competing deterrent strate-
gies. 
What one can say, however, is that in spite of the great abstract 
endorsement of deterrence, nuclear weapons are viewed rather critically in 
the FRG. In April 1983 (FGW), two-thirds of respondents said they feit 
threatened by nuclear weapons in general, that is more than usually say so 
about the Soviet Union (see Table 4.6). In the same survey, people were 
interviewed about whether they believed nuclear armaments to be accept-
able for Christians. Only nine percent agreed unconditionally, 44 percent 
held nuclear arms tobe acceptable for defensive purposes only, and 47 
percent entirely ruled out any compatibility between nuclear weaponry 
and Christianity. lnterestingly, this latter view was most strongly shared 
by people without any religion (62 percent) and Christians with lowest 
church attendance (57 percent). These findings, again, leave one wonder-
ing what conclusions public opinion surveys on these matters really do 
permit. Nuclear weapons, after all, are the key instrument of deterrence. 
Still, the latter is accepted much more readily if it is not related to the 
"ugly" term nuclear weapons. One is tempted to speculate how low 
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Table 4.19 Do you think the double-track decision to be a good one 1lfD)7 
5/81 7/81 8/81 9/81 1/82 12/82 8/83 
Yes 53(73) 52(71) 49(65) 50(69) 52(70) 51(67) 49(68) 
No 20(27) 21 (29) 26(35) 22(31) 22(30) 25(33) 23(32) 
OK, NA 27 27 25 28 26 24 28 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
support for deterrence could drop if some more "ugly" information were 
tied to it in survey stimuli. 
NEW MISSILES IN EUROPE 
Data on the West German public's level of information about NATO's 
double-track decision are not very recent, but they still must be reported 
in order to put the subsequent description of attitudes into perspective. In 
May Ouly) 1981, 63 percent (77) had heard or read about the NATO 
decision, according to Piß. From the same source we learn, however, that 
awareness did not imply precise knowledge of the substance of this 
decision. Faced with an open-ended question on what it is about, in May 
(July) 1981, 48 percent (41) said they could not tell. Only nine percent in 
May (11 in July) correctly described the December 1979 decision. Most of 
the wrong responses (almost one-third of the total) characterized this 
decision as aiming for unilateral Western armaments buildup. Most likely 
the level of information will have increased somewhat in the meantime, 
but as this information was polled more than a year and a half after the 
initial decision had set off the public debate there is reason to doubt that 
such changes could be dramatic. 
In the past several years quite a number of survey studies on the public's 
reaction to the NATO decision have been performed. Since 1981, IfD has 
repeatedly polled attitudes toward this decision after presenting its con-
tents to respondents in a simplified version. While about one-quarter of 
samples consistently refused any judgment, more than two-thirds of 
evaluations were in favor of the double-track decision, indicating wide-
spread support of parallel negotiations and missile deployments (Table 
4.19). 
Similar results from Piß are available for May and July 1981. Adjusting 
for the level of no responses, 68 percent agreed that the NATO decision 
was the right thing to do, since the USSR would not be willing to negotiate 
without threats of Western INF deployment, 57 percent did not endorse 
the view that the West was strong enough and INF deployment, therefore, 
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was unnecessary. At the same time, there was majority opposition (55 
percent) against INF without parallel negotiations, and a rather favorable 
response toward Eastern moratorium initiatives (63 percent in favor). All 
these distributions, however, should be seen in the light of 62 percent 
agreement that these defense issues are so complex they should be left to 
experts because the average citizen could not judge them. 
In the same survey, agreement with the double-track decision was 
significantly lower if the stimulus did not tie the prospect of deployment to 
the need to force the USSR to the negotiating table. A narrow majority (52 
percent) believed that the greater part of the German population expected 
INF deployment to be inevitable. Regarding the perceived preferences of 
a series of political actors, some selected results deserve being mentioned: 
The United States. was perceived as extremely favorable toward INF, 
Chancellor Schmidt only slightly less so; Schmidt's party, the SPD, was 
seen as rejecting them by a clear majority. 
August 1983 data from IfD show even more clearly how an appropriate 
choice of question wording can reduce-or even reverse-anti-INF major-
ities. Respondents were asked whether they were in favor of or opposed to 
Pershing II deployment, if "Soviet SS-20s would continue tobe targeted 
on Western Europe". With 23 percent undecided, 37 percent favored, and 
40 percent opposed deployment. When presented with a choice between 
deployment and the FRG's leaving NATO, 46 percent chose missiles, 22 
percent would abandon the Alliance, and 32 percent did not respond. In 
the same survey, 50 percent said that currently there was no INF balance 
between East and West (only 13 percent believed this tobe the case), and 
59 percent (24 percent) replied that such an INF balance is (not) neces-
sary. At the same time, however, 46 percent advocated unilateralism in 
arms control; 37 percent were opposed (in July 1981 figures bad been 33 
and 47 percent, respectively). 
Findings by FGW stand in stark opposition to what has just been 
reported. lnquiring how the West should proceed with the double-track 
decision, FGW found in May 1981 that 67 percent of its sample favored 
immediate negotiations without any Western deployments, 25 percent 
favored immediate negotiations with simultaneous Western arming to 
achieve parity, and only six percent favored NATO INF deployments 
without negotiations. 
These are obvious effects of question wording. If you ask for attitudes 
on the NATO decision or mention SS-20s, as IfD did, positive sentiments 
vis-a-vis NATO or fear of Soviet missiles produce positive evaluations of 
United States INF, as a direct choice between the two tracks implied by 
this decision is not required. If it is required, an overwhelming majority 
emerges for the negotiating track and against deployment, which logically 
implies comparatively low support for the NATO decision as it was taken. 
This is also evident from a February (May) 1983 survey by FGW, in which 
55 percent (50) of respondents agreed with the demand not to deploy any 
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new missiles in the FRG, no matter what the East would do. The smaller 
majority against deployment (compared to the 67 percent in May 1981) is 
most likely again due to an instrument effect, as the side condition 
"regardless of Eastern behavior" loads the stimulus in favor of disagree-
ment. Without its inclusion, resistance to new missiles would have scored 
much higher, according to the FGW instrumen:f: lt d~es not come as a big 
surprise that in a very recent study by1 FGW (June 1983) opposition 
against new missiles in the respondent's area ran at 79 percent. 
Let us now have a look at the perceptions of motivations of the 
superpowers to pursue INF arms contföl and at expectations and prefer-
ences of the German public regarding theJ"uture of these talks. In July 
1981 (PIB), about 30 percent of respondents feit unable to evaluate 
superpower interest in INF limitations; of those who passed a judgment, 
about 70 percent held each superpower to be interested in such accords. In 
the same study the largest part of the sample ( 46 percent, with eight 
percent giving no response) expected failure of arms control negotiations 
over INF and a subsequent arms race; 37 percent predicted an agreement 
between the United States and the USSR that would be coupled with some 
Western INF deployment. Only nine percent expected reductions of 
Soviet missiles to an extent that would allow the United States to refrain 
from stationing INF in Europe. Recent data by FGW (July 1983) is not 
directly comparable, as here respondents were asked whether they ex-
pected deployment of new missiles in the FRG this year. Sixty-two percent 
answered that they expect this to happen, and 37 percent replied in the 
negative--suggesting a remarkably high proportion of optimists still 
believing in timely success of negotiations. 
We have already seen that recent FGW data showed substantial opposi-
tion against new missiles in the FRG in summer 1983. This opposition 
emerged even stronger when people were asked what course of action they 
would prefer if the Geneva talks would fail to produce agreement until fall 
1983. In July 1983 (September 1983, after the downing of the Korean 
airliner by the Soviets), 76 (65) percent of the sample preferred continuing 
negotiations without INF deployment; 20 (31) percent opted for continu-
ing negotiations with parallel deployment; while only three percent called 
for discontinuing talks and stationing missiles. This information is to be 
interpreted with great caution, however. The three alternatives presented 
to respondents do not embrace the possibility that negotiations not only do 
not lead to agreement but prove entirely futile and are aborted, so there 
would be no arena for continuing talks. One can be very sure that under 
such conditions the pattern of responses would look totally different. 
ENHANCED RADIATION WARHEADS 
Two other recent survey items concerning enhanced radiation weapons 
(ERWs) confirm the above pattern of attitudes toward Western nuclear 
capabilities. In August 1981, FGW polled attitudes toward President 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 137 
Reagan's decision to build ERWs and on whether the FRG should consent 
to the stationing of ERWs on her territory. With very few refusals, 62 
percent of the sample disapproved of the decision to proceed with ERWs, 
and 69 percent said the FRG should refuse to have them deployed here. 
This is not at all surprising: defense and deterrence are accepted as general 
principles, but when it comes to specific scenarios, sacrifices, measures to 
increase military capabilities, or to particular weapon systems, enthusiasm 
is very low, especially with nuclear weapons that have been the object of 
mainly critical and highly publicized debates. 
INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN ITEMS 
Some of the interrelations between items that have been descriptively 
analyzed in this section appear as moderately strong and substantively 
interesting. Feeling threatened by nuclear weapons and evaluating them as 
acceptable for Christians "hang together" as follows (FGW 4/83): almost 
two-thirds of those who feel threatened by these arms reject them as 
incompatible with Christian standards, whereas more than 80 percent of 
those who feel no such threat judge them as either unconditionally (19 
percent) acceptable for Christians or at least in a defensive framework (62 
percent). 
Among items on INF talks or deployment, several patterns deserve 
being mentioned: Of those who supported the demand by no means to 
station Western INF, 88 percent favored continuing negotiations without 
deployment in case no timely agreement should be achieved. Of those who 
rejected the first position, only 54 percent favored the same approach 
toward possible failure of the Geneva talks (FGW 5/83). Not surprisingly, 
among those who would not agree to missile deployment in their area, 86 
percent favored continuing negotiations without deployment, 78 percent 
of those who would bear with stationing new missiles close to their 
residence opted for introducing Western INF should negotiations not be 
satisfactorily completed by the end of 1983 (FGW 6/83). lt also conforms 
to expectations that those who resist INF deployment even if no agree-
ment should be completed by a large majority (82 percent) call for a 
referendum on stationing these missiles; whereas all others reject this 
introduction of direct democracy into national security policy by an almost 
equally strong margin (FGW 7/83). 
A final association that can be reported here is between agreement with 
the decision to build ERW and with possible ERW deployment in the 
FRG (FGW 8/81). The figures show such a high correlation that one could 
almost talk about multiple measurement of the same underlying attitude. 
Seventy percent of those who agree with the ERW decision would also go 
along with deployment in the FRG: Ninety-four percent of those who 
disapprove of the ERW decision would oppose deployment here. Only 15 
percent of the total sample have held inconsistent views. 
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Images of Allies 
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
The last of the four main themes of this descriptive overview begins with 
evaluations of the relations between the FRG and the United States. 
According to Table 4.20, there was no decrease during the 1970s in the 
extent to which collaboration with the United States was regarded as more 
important than with the USSR. Quite the contrary: although in 1973 there 
was an absolute majority for equally close relations with both superpo-
wers, through the late 1970s and until 1981 supporters of closer ties with 
the United States outnumbered those in favor of equally close relations. 
Moreover, in February 1982 (CC), 43 percent fully and 41 percent 
partially agreed that cooperation and friendship with the United States 
should play a bigger role in German foreign policy. 
By 1983, however, something had clearly transpired. Tue majority of 
meaningful responses had shifted back to favoring an equally close 
relationship with both superpowers. When one compares the recent HD 
data with those of May 1981, the change is in fact quite significant. This 
decline in the importance attached to closer collaboration with the United 
States is confirmed by the most recent Atlantic Institute survey (11/83). In 
response to the question on what was most important for future Western 
security, a full 19 percent drop occurred since the autumn 1982 (from 53 
te 34 percent) in those who chose effective cooperation between Europe 
and the United States. Ranking first in the 1983 survey was continued 
dialogue with the Soviets (up from 33 to 42 percent of respondents). lt is 
difficult to determine how temporary or permanent a shift this is and what 
its causes are. But given the consistent negative image of the Soviet Union 
described earlier, the origin of the shift must lie in a German loss of 
confidence in the United States and probably in current American poli-
cies. The magnitude of the shift should not be overdrawn, but it is 
nevertheless real. 
In July 1980 the most important aspect of relations between the FRG 
and the United States for West Germans was the economic one, according 
to FGW (50 percent). Mutual support and military cooperation followed 
behind (27 and 17 percent, respectively). Sports (four percent) and 
recognition of United States leadership (three percent) were considered of 
minor importance. What makes collaboration with the United States 
desirable for West Germans is predominantly cooperation in the fields of 
economy and security. 
Relations between the United States and the FRG were evaluated as 
good by 67 percent of respondents in August 1981 and by 75 percent (59) 
in May (August) 1982, according to FGW. Evaluations of this kind are 
really hard to make for average respondents, so the high volatility of this 
data and their susceptibility to short-term fiuctuations are not unusual. 
Table 4.20 Should we, in the future, strive for closer collaboration with the United States or the USSR (lfD)? 
5/73 10/77 9/78 1/80 5/81 7/81 12/81 1/83 3/83 4/83 6/83 
US 36(39) 49(55) 51 (58) 49(53) 56(63) 50(56) 45(52) 39(43) 40(44) 42(47) 42(46) 
Equally close 54(58) 38(43) 36(41) 41(45) 32(36) 37(42) 41(47) 51(56) 49(54) 46(52) 47(52) 
USSR 3 (3) 2 (2) 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 ( 1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (2) 
OK.NA 7 11 12 8 11 11 13 9 10 11 9 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
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Table 4.21 In what direction have relations between the FRG and the US changed 
"recently" (lfO)/"since Reagan took office" (FGW)7 
lfD FGW FGW 
3/73 8/81 5/82 
lmproved 10(11) 9 5 (5) 
Remained the same 50(57) 49 51 (52) 
Oeteriorated 27(31) 42 43(43) 
OK, NA 13 0 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
People probably make such judgments in reaction to current news, so 
most likely the low August 1982 rating was produced by U.S. action 
against European firms involved in the pipeline deal with the USSR. All in 
all, however, this degree of satisfaction with bilateral relations may to 
some extent explain why the personal and "national" salience of good 
relations with the United States ranks so low in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
Many more people have perceived a deterioration rather than an 
improvement in U.S.-FRG relations at various points during the past 
decade (see Table 4.21) but this is not contradictory with two-thirds of 
respondents describing relations as "good." First, there seems tobe some 
kind of "negativity bias" in this instrument, as is shown by the IfD 
measurements from 1973, because difficulties and strains in transatlantic 
relations naturally receive far more media attention than smooth coopera-
tion. Second, reference to President Reagan in the FGW question proba-
bly reinforced that bias. In February 1982, the U.S. president's foreign 
policy vis-a-vis the East was regarded as too hard-line and as a danger to 
detente by 43 percent of a CC sample; 39 percent partially agreed to this 
view. Thus, it is probable that the perception of deterioration is exagger-
Table4.22 Generally speaking, do you like the Americans ( lfD)7 
12/57 4/61 7/62 5/65 1/67 5/73 3/75 
Yes 39(47) 51 (61) 54(61) 58(64) 47(54) 48(54) 42(49) 
In between 20(24) 17(20) 17(19) 13(14) 16(18) 17(19) 21(25) 
No 24(29) 16(19) 18(20) 19(21) 24(28) 24(27) 21125) 
OK,NA 17 16 11 10 13 11 16 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
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ated in Table 4.21. This suspicion is supported by SOWI data from 
October 1979 and February 1980, in which more than two-thirds of those 
expressing an opinion expected U.S.-FRG relations to stay the same, 
about one-fifth expected improvements, and one-tenth deterioration. The 
former two expectations were disappointed, but not to the degree ap-
parently indicated by Table 4.21. 
On the actual and desired style of relations between the FRG and the 
United States little survey information is available. In 1972 SFK pre-
sented a sample with the statement that the freedom of action for the FRG 
was so little one could almost describe her as a U .S. satellite and asked for 
the extent of agreement or disagreement on a scale (from + 3 to - 3). For 
the 87 percent of respondents who made a judgment the mean scale score 
was exactly zero (agreement was exactly balanced by disagreement). In 
August 1981, and again in May 1982, FGW presented samples with the 
choice whether in case of disagreement the FRG should adopt United 
States views or decide according to her own interests. Only about one-
quarter of respondents were in favor of adopting United States policies, 
whereas three-quarters thought the FRG should follow her own interests. 
This, by the way, stands in remarkable contrast to Schoessler and Weede's 
(1978,60) .findings for West German elites, in which, 63 percent of the 
sample endorsed the notion that "minors" within alliances should accept 
superpower guidance. In summary, close relations with the United States 
are seen as very desirable by a !arge majority of West Germans who also 
view relations as quite satisfactory, although levels of confidence appear to 
have dropped. Above all, and this may be related to the drop in confi-
dence, there is a decided rejection of any political subordination of the 
FRG-as people of almost any nation would. 
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 
Underlying the desire for close cooperation are favorable attitudes vis-a-vis 
the United States and widespread convictions about her indispensability 
for the security of Europe. Table 4.22, which unfortunately only runs 
through 1975, shows the longitudinally stable positive stereotype of 
America in West Germany. This series is continued by a PIB thermometer 
of feelings (from -5 to + 5) about the United States The mean score in 
1979 was 1.9, in April 1980 it was 2.0, andin February 1982 it was 1.6; so 
there really was no significant change in images of the United States since 
the mid-1970s. Table 4.23 clearly demonstrates that the support for the 
presence of American troops in Europe has not faltered since the Berlin 
crises. In the early years of NATO a withdrawal of United States troops 
would have been quite popular; nowadays it would be regretted by four 
out of five people who comment on the issue. For the past twenty years, 
little disagreement over the importance of American security guarantees 
and of their symbolic representation by troops in Europe has been 
discernible in survey data. 
Table 4.23 lf the United Stetes were to pull their troops out of Europa, would you welcome or regret this (lfD)? 
7/56 1/57 12/57 6/62 4/69 5/70 5/73 6/76 8/78 9/79 9/81 
Welcome 51(71) 33(49) 34(50) 12(17) 17(23) 22(30) 23(34) 15(22) 17(23) 11115) 17(22) 
Regret 22(30) 34(51) 34(50) 59(83) 56(77) 51 (70) 45(66) 54(78) 57(77) 60(85) 59(78) 
OK.NA 27 33 32 29 27 27 32 31 26 29 24 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
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Table4.24 Does NATO hava mora advantagas or mora disatlvantagas for the FRG 
(lfD)? 
11/55 4/59 8/63 9/71 9/79 5/81 12/81 
More 20(71) 35(88) 33(87) 47(82) 48(87) 55(80) 50(82) 
advantages 
More 8(29) 5(12) 5(13) 10(18) 7(13) 14(20) 11(18) 
disadvantages 
OK, NA 72 60 62 43 •5 31 39 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO 
Up to the 1980s, NATO has always been evaluated by large majorities as 
having more advantages than disadvantages for the FRG (Table 4.24), 
even though insecurity of judgment has been rather high, mainly due to 
low (but growing) information on what NATO is. That an alliance is seen 
as yielding more advantages than disadvantages does not necessarily 
imply, however, that one prefers this alliance to other (e.g., nonaligned) 
security pollcies. Unfortunately, the IfD series on neutralism vs. the 
Western Alliance only extends up to 1975 (Table 4.25). lt contains far 
lower levels of no response than Table 4.24 and shows considerably 
smaller enthusiasm for NATO than for American troops in Europe, with 
no obvious longitudinal trend. This discrepancy between regret about 
hypothetical American troop withdrawal and comparatively high popular-
ity of neutralism could to some extent be explained by question wording, 
as in Table 4.25 German ties to NATO and the United States are 
juxtaposed to "neutrality," a concept that does not exclusively bear 
negative connotations. If withdrawal of American troops from Europe 
Tabla4.25 Should tha FRG continue its alliance with tha West (America) or try tobe 
neutral (lfD) 7 
12/55 9/61 9/65 5/69 5/73 9/74 2/75 
Western 43(60) 40(49) 46(55) 44(54) 41(49) 51(57) 48(57) 
Alliance 
Neutral 29(40) 42(51) 37(45) 38(46) 42(51) 38(43) 36(43) 
OK,NA 28 18 17 18 17 11 16 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
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Table4.26 Agreement with statements on NATO (lfD) 
1/69 9/71 3/76 
NATO has brought Western countries closer together 51 51 53 
NATO is not strong enough to defend Europe against agression 39 28 31 
NATO nations disagree too much 33 24 31 
Without NATO we would have been attacked already 32 32 35 
Russians are afraid of NATO defense 28 29 28 
NATO has too little influence over member nations 25 15 21 
NATO's main benefits go to US 19 18 18 
were linked to some positive alternative, regret would probably also be 
much lower. 
Even though the lfD series stops in 1975, some more recent evidence is 
available, although not directly comparable. Data reported by Just and 
Muelhens (1981) on the FRG trying to maintain good relations with the 
United States vs. the USSR vs. aspiring for neutrality show very clearly 
that in 1980 and 1981 somewhat lower proportions of respondents opted 
for neutrality than throughout the 1950s and 1960s. A report for the 
United States International Communications Agency (Shaffer 1981) dem-
onstrated that-faced with a direct choice between staying in NATO and 
the FRG becoming neutral-in February 1982; 70 percent were in favor of 
continued NATO membership, 13 percent in favor of neutrality, and 17 
percent did not reply. Even though they do not contain explicit references 
to neutrality, the following data also corroborate NATO's outstanding 
acceptance in the FRG until now. In May 1981 (PIB), 69 percent 
advocated continuing membership in the present form, only 13 percent 
called for reducing German ties to NATO, and 18 percent refused to 
commit themselves. Two years later, in May 1983, 89 percent said that 
NATO is necessary to preserve peace in Europe; only ten percent dis-
agreed (FGW). The same survey shows that 83 percent of respondents 
held German membership in NATO tobe a "good thing," seven percent 
did not think so, and ten percent did not care. In August 1983 (IfD), with 
19 percent undecided, 72 percent favored continuing FRG membership in 
NATO; only nine percent wanted to get out. The prevalent motivations 
for endorsing NATO can be clearly read from Table 4.26. NATO is 
accepted for the FRG because it serves to promote collaboration among 
Western nations and because of its peace-keeping and deterrent roles. lt 
was mainly criticized for a lack of strength. Yet as we have seen earlier, 
there is very little willingness to support activities by the FRG to do 
anything about this. There also was some criticism of NATO members 
disagreeing too much and of the alliance's inability to reduce dissonance. 
On the whole, however, agreement with positive Statements on NATO was 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 145 
Table 4.27 To what extent could we rely upon the United States in case of conflict 
(SOWI)? 
12/77 10/79 2/80 
Totally 24(25) 20(22) 21(23) 
Very much 43(45) 36(39) 38(41) 
Somewhat 27(28) 32(34) 32(34) 
Not at all 3 (3) 5 (5) 3 (3) 
OK, NA 4 7 7 
Note: In brackets: percentages without OK, NA 
stronger and has increased, and acceptance of negative statements has 
decreased over the period covered in Table 4.26. 
RELIABILITY OF NATO AND THE UNITED STATES 
Predominantly positive evaluations of NATO and of the United States 
among sizeable majorities of West Germans would logically be very 
implausible if they were not backed by a belief in the reliability of the allies 
in critical situations. In 1977 through 1980, SOWI three times surveyed 
mass opinion on the extent to which the FRG could rely upon NATO and 
the United States in case of conßict (Tables 4.27 and 4.28). These data 
show that virtually no distinction was being made between NATO as a 
whole and the United States; the reliability of the lauer was obviously seen 
as the key necessary and suffi.cient ingredient in the reliability of the 
former. There were surptisingly few refusals to make this judgment, and 
complete treachery was expected only by negligible portions of samples. 
Expectations of rather low ("somewhat") reliability of the allies increased 
slightly between 1977 and 1980, up to around one-third of respondents, 
with all remaining persons believing that the FRG in case of conßict could 
rely on NATO and the United States "totally" or at least "very much." 
According to PIB, in March 1981, 72 percent said they believed the 
United States would come to the assistance of the FRG and West Berlin in 
times of crisis; only 12 percent disagreed; and 16 percent refused to 
answer. Three out offour ofthose who believed in United States assistance 
said the United States would behave that way in any case, the others 
believed the United States would do so only if threatened themselves. In 
February 1982, again according to PIB, belief in the reliability of United 
States guarantees in crisis was even higher, at 78 percent. In August 1983 
(IfD) 62 percent expected the United States to resist Soviet aggression 
against the FRG, 19 percent did not believe so, and the remainder were 
undecided. 
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Table 4.28 To what extent could we rely upon NATO in case of conflict (SOWI)? 
12/77 10/79 2/80 
Totally 27(28) 20(22) 18(20) 
Very much 43(44) 39(42) 39(42) 
Somewhat 24(25) 30(32) 30(33) 
Not at all 4 (4) 4 (4) 4 (4) 
DK,NA 3 7 8 
Note: In brackets: percentages without DK, NA 
DECISION MAKING IN NATO 
We have already seen above that positive evaluations of and favorable 
attitudes vis-a-vis the United States have gone along with a clear rejection 
of subordination. Similarly, majoricy endorsement of NATO does not 
involve widespread acceptance of United States leadership in the alliance. 
This is amply demonstrated by two items from FGW surveys. In the 
context of the decision to build ERWs respondents were interviewed in 
August 1981 as to whether this type of decision should be taken by NATO 
or by the United States alone. With almost everyone responding, 83 
percent opted for a NATO decision. One might assume this implies that 
part of the resistance to the decision taken by President Reagan was due to 
its perceived unilateral character and that opposition would have been 
smaller if the federal government had been obliged internally to defend an 
alliance decision like the one of December 1979. This point should not be 
exaggerated, however. Much of the support for a decision by NATO 
probably stems from the hope that it would have looked different. lt is 
indeed very hard to disentangle pro-NATO and antinuclear sentiments in 
these responses. 
In February 1980, respondents were asked what relations between 
Western Europe and the United States should look like. Not surprisingly, 
65 percent demanded equal rights for both sides, only 13 percent pre-
ferred U.S. leadership, and 22 percent advocated political independence 
of Western Europe from the United States. Mass support for NATO in the 
FRG thus is intimately linked to the general notion that the alliance has to 
accommodate the interests of all participating nations. 
INTERRELATIONS AMONG ITEMS 
Most of the patterns that can be reported here refer to evaluations of the 
relations between the United States and the FRG. In May 1982, 83 
percertt of those who judged these relations as bad said they bad deterio-
rated since President Reagan took office; among those who evaluated them 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 147 
as good, 63 percent said they had registered no changes since then (FGW). 
The percentage of those describing U.S.-FRG relations as good declined 
from 86 percent to 68 percent as one moved from a very positive to a very 
negative evaluation of the U.S. president; the percentage reporting a 
recent deterioration in relations rose in parallel from 25 to 65 percent. 
Obviously the highly abstract judgment on bilateral relations in general 
and their dynamics is heavily colored by sentiments about people that are 
easier to evaluate. 
This relationship seems to be even stronger for people's position on the 
issue of whether in case of disagreement the FRG should pursue her own 
interests or adopt U.S. views. People who evaluated Reagan very posi-
tively favored adopting U.S. policies by a 71 to 28 percent majority, 
whereas very negative ratings for Reagan produced 87 percent in favor of 
following FRG interests. Another set of cross-tabulations from an August 
1981 FGW survey does not yield any additional insight, as its emphasis 
was on the issue of who should make decisions such as the one on ERW in 
the future. As an overwhelming majority of respondents (85 percent) was 
in favor of NATO, rather than U.S. decisions, there logically can be only 
little variation within the categories of other variables subsumed under 
this theme. 
Patterns of Public Opinion on National Security 
INTRODUCTION 
After describing the development of public opinion on national security in 
the Federal Republic in recent years, we now want to look at some 
structures that can be detected within these attitudes. In this section we 
will investigate the interrelations of opinions on individual items among 
the four general themes addressed in this study. In the subsequent final 
section the attitudes that have been described will be broken down 
according to respondents' position in the social structure and their parti-
san affiliations. 
In this enterprise we have to be aware of some methodological and 
substantive limitations. First, the number of associations that could be 
reported is potentially enormous, so we have to be selective, occasionally 
choosing just one or two indicators from each of the four major themes for 
assessing interrelations. Second, for quite a number of combinations of 
items no data at all are available, as the two items have never appeared 
together in one survey. Third, for the same reason, it is not possible to 
construct indices for various dimensions of public opinion on defense-for 
example, information, salience, consistency of attitudes, or optimism-
that could then be related to each other, to possible causal variables, or to 
individual national security items. 
For such a hierarchical causal analysis to be feasible, all relevant 
measurements would have to be available for one and the same sample of 
respondents instead of being scattered over a multitude of surveys. The 
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most recent major single survey covering a great number of relevant 
aspects of national security attitudes is from October 1979. Its results have 
been analyzed with a reasonable degree of sophistication by Raeder ( 1982). 
This study is too old, however, to evaluate developments over the past few 
years, its original data set was not accessible ( only cross-tabulations were 
available), and national security attitudes since 1979 had to be collected 
from two dozen or so separate surveys. The above, combined with what 
follows, might thus be the most extensive review of patterns of public 
opinion on national security in the FRG, but it must fall short of 
perfection. Only bivariate relationships are presented (e.g., whether per-
ception of a foreign threat increases the willingness to accept new nuclear 
weapons in Europe), but no controls could be performed. lt is impossible, 
therefore, to ascertain whether this association between threat perception 
and acceptance of new missiles is stronger with men or women, with the 
better or the less educated, with CDU/CSU or SPD followers, with those 
for whom national security is more or less salient, and so on. 
IMAGES OF SECURITY AND OF THE SOVIET UNION 
We will first examine the associations between perceptions of the military 
balance and the military threat on the one band and evaluations of the 
stability of peace, the danger of war, and salience of national security, 
information, and interest on the other. For those who perceived militar-y 
parity in May 1982 (FGW), evaluations of the stability of peace were 
almost equally divided between "no change" and "less stability." Interest-
ingly, those who judged either the East or the West as superior had rather 
similar response patterns, with roughly one third reporting "no change" 
and two-thirds reporting less stability of peace. 
Between perceived military threat and danger of war we find a very 
close association. Fifty-three percent of respondents with perceptions of 
high threat perceived a high danger of war (BMV 10/79), 39 percent saw 
this danger to be low, eight percent did not know or did not answer. 
Respondents who evaluated the military threat as low predominantly also 
held the danger of war to be small (71 percent); only seven percent 
reported high danger of war, and 22 percent did not commit themselves. 
In the same survey, there was no relationship at all between threat 
perception and judgments on the importance of national security as a 
political goal for the FRG. Remaining associations with indicators of 
salience, information, and interest are summarized in Table 4.29. High 
threat perceptions went along with somewhat higher evaluations of the 
importance of the armed forces and with more interest in national security 
affairs but were unrelated to the level of information. Of course, it is 
impossible here to say anything definitive on the direction of causality: Do 
people regard the Bundeswehr as more important and devote some 
attention to these questions because they feel the military threat to be 
high, or vice versa? 
For October 1980 we have some evidence on the impact of threat 
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Table 4.29 The military threat and the importance of armed forces, information, and 
interest (BMV 10/791 
Military threat 
High Low 
Budeswehr is 
Very important 33 15 
lmportant 52 64 
Less important 15 20 
Information on defense 
Very good 17 17 
Good 13 14 
Deficient 69 69 
Correct responses on who is to 32 36 
authorize use of nuclear weapons 
lnterest in media reports on defense 
Yes 51 43 
No 49 57 
perception on attitudes toward the defense budget (FGW). For those 
respondents who said the threat had decreased, a large majority (77 
percent) evaluated defense spending as excessive, 16 percent said it was 
just right, and only seven percent regarded it as too smalL Among those 
who perceived the threat as having remained unchanged, 49 percent 
rejected military spending as too high. 46 percent were content, and six 
percent pleaded for more. Of those who thought the military threat to 
have grown, 35 percent regarded defense spending as exaggerated, 51 
percent were satisfied, and 14 percent said it was too low. 
In the October 1979 BMV survey, threat perception had a nonobvious 
relationship with opinions on the feasibility and acceptability of military 
defense. Those who regarded the military threat as high had a stronger 
tendency to advocate military defense against attack, even if this would 
involve nuclear war on FRG territory. On the other hand, these respon-
dents at the same time were more sceptical of the chances for success of 
Western defense against Eastern attack. Thirty-two percent said such an 
attack could not be repelled, a view that was shared by only 10 percent of 
those who perceived the military threat as low. One possible interpretation 
for this pattern is that high threat perception may be more an outgrowth of 
a "pessimistic" attitude toward national security (just like scepticism 
about the feasibility of defense) than the product of gathering and 
analyzing relevant information. This is supported by the zero relationship 
between threat perception and the level of information. 
Perceptions of the military balance in this survey were only weakly 
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Table 4.30 Soviet armaments and the salience of national security, information, and 
interest (BMV 1onsl 
Soviet armaments Soviet armaments 
have are due to 
not offensive defensive 
grown grown motives motives 
Bundeswehr is 
Very important 21 7 24 18 
lmportant 63 50 61 65 
Less important 16 24 16 17 
National security is a top 
political priority 
Yes 15 11 14 14 
No 85 89 86 86 
Information on defense 
Very good 19 7 14 16 
Good 14 13 16 16 
Deficient 67 80 70 68 
1 nterest in media reports 
on defense 
Yes 41 24 40 39 
No 59 76 60 61 
related to measures of salience and of interest; there was no relationship at 
all with the level of information. Those who regarded the East as militarily 
superior held the Bundeswehr to be somewhat more important and gave 
slightly higher priority to national security as a political objective for the 
FRG. Those who saw rough military parity had the lowest level of interest 
in defense matters. Table 4.30 reveals that perceptions of whether Soviet 
military capabilities have grown or not were much more important, but 
that the motivations ascribed to the Soviet military buildup were virtually 
unrelated to images of security. If Soviet capability was seen to have 
increased over the past years, the Bundeswehr was judged as more 
important, and these respondents were significantly more interested in 
defense and had more knowledge of these things. 
Associations between perceptions of East-West relations and images of 
security are available from several surveys. From an October 1981 FGW 
survey we learn that people who evaluated bilateral USSR-FRG relations 
as bad were much more likely to see peace in Europe as having become less 
secure. Surprisingly, this latter perception was not associated with a 
stronger desire to extend bilateral relations; people obviously did not 
believe this to be an appropriate strategy for increasing the stability of 
peace. This finding is similar to those in Table 4.28: there does not seem to 
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Table 4.31 Perceptions of the military balance and of the military threat and positions 
toward INF deployment (FGW 5/831 
Who is superior? Military threat? 
Both 
East equal West Yes No 
Continue negotiations, 66 76 78 70 74 
no 1 N F deployment 
Continue negotiations 29 22 19 27 24 
and deploy INF 
Deploy INF, 4 3 2 3 
discontinue negotiations 
be an instrumental concept of East-West relations; rather there are 
optimists and pessimists. The former think relations are good and should 
be improved, the lauer view them as bad and are not enthusiastic about 
improvements. 
In the October 1979 BMV survey, all associations between perceptions 
and expectations of East-West relations and the indicators of salience, 
interest and information were practically zero, the only exception being 
that people who expected these relations to deteriorate more often than 
others feit the Bundeswehr tobe very important. Finally, there is a report 
from FGW of October 1981 indicating that attitudes vis-a-vis the peace 
movetnent had very little to do with perceptions of East-West relations. 
IMAGES OF DETERRENCE AND OF THE SOVIET UNION 
In this section, there are some interesting findings from a May 1983 study 
that are described in Table 4.31. When faced with alternatives on how to 
proceed if the Geneva talks failed to produce agreement, only a negligible 
share of the sample opted for INF deployments without continuing arms 
control negotiations. The other two alternatives, continuing negotiations 
without deployment or a parallel approach, were chosen in systematic 
covariation with perceptions of the military balance and of the military 
threat, the direction of patterns being as expected. As in the previous 
subsection, perception of the military balance again emerges as a more 
potent predictor of other defense-related attitudes than threat perception. 
However, even among those who perceived Eastern superiority and a 
military threat, we find two-thirds majorities in favor of negotiations only. 
As almost half of respondents saw the East to be superior, more than 30 
percent of the total sample at the same time said the East was ahead in 
military power and that there should be no Western deployment of INF. 
lt would require the assumption that we do not want to make-that 
NATO deployment is indispensable in order to compensate for Eastern 
152 HANS RATTINGER 
superiority to describe these respondents' attitudes as contradictory or 
illogical. We prefer the interpretation that here we have the typical 
situation of more general and more specific defense attitudes falling apart 
for people for whom these things are not terribly important. When asked 
generally about the military threat or the military balance, people respond 
on the basis of very general feelings, whatever their factual or cognitive 
foundation might be. When asked specifically about new missiles, most 
people reject them, many probably not even being aware that the two 
issues may be related. Only with a minority do attitudes on the one 
dimension have an impact on those on the other, and this minority 
produces the aggregate relationship visible in Table 4.31. Such a pattern 
clearly would be inconceivable with very salient items. One could never 
observe large majorities of those who think unemployment to be a major 
evil opposing concrete measures to cope with it. 
IMAGES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OF THE ALLIES 
On the relationship between images of the Soviet Union and of the allies 
little evidence is available. In the October 1979 BMV survey, threat 
perception had no effect at all on evaluations of the reliability of NATO 
and of the United States. In May 1983 (FGW), on the other hand, 
perceptions of the military balance and of the necessity of NATO clearly 
were related. If the East was viewed as superior, NATO was rated as 
indispensable by 95 percent; if both sides were viewed as equally strong, 
this percentage was 87 percent-still high, but definitely lower. 
Data by FGW from June 1980 suggest that evaluations of the impor-
tance of good relations with the West or with the East run highly parallel. 
As the bulk of responses falls into the "very important" or "important" 
category there can hardly be any widespread pattern of stressing relations 
with one side at the expense of the other. Rather there are those for whom 
good external relations of the FRG, whether with the East or with the 
allies, are very important, and those for whom all international relations 
are personally of minor concern. Finally, in July 1980 (also FGW) 
respondents who named the preservation of peace as the most important 
aspect of East-West relations were somewhat more likely to identify 
military cooperation or mutual support as the most important aspect of 
relations with the United States than those who selected other areas of 
East-West relations (economic, cultural, or sports exchange, or human 
rights) as most salient (52 percent as against 36 percent). 
IMAGES OF SECURITY AND OF DETERRENCE 
From a survey performed by FGW in May 1983, we can learn how images 
of security and of deterrence are currently associated in the FRG. Among 
those for whom the stability of peace in Europe was perceived as having 
remained the same over the past year, only 46 percent agreed with the 
position not to deploy any new missiles in the country, no matter what the 
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East would do; however among those who believed that peace had become 
less secure, this percentage was 60 percent. Similarly, only 70 percent in 
the first group and 77 percent in the second group preferred to continue 
negotiations without missile deployment if the Geneva negotiations should 
fail to succeed before the end of 1983. This clearly shows that, apart from 
possible instrumental considerations, all these attitudes on peace and new 
missiles to a certain extent reflect a dimension of public anxiety that 
increases resistance to nuclear weapons as peace is perceived as being 
endangered. Data from the same study also show quite clearly that the 
peace movement in the FRG was evaluated far more positively by respon-
dents who wanted arms control negotiations to be continued without INF 
deployment than by those who were willing to station these weapons 
should no timely agreement be found. 
IMAGES OF SECURITY AND OF THE ALLIES 
A similar pattern to that in the previous section can be observed between 
perceptions of peace and evaluations of the Western Alliance. Ninety-
three percent of those people who believed that nothing had changed as to 
the stability of peace, and only 83 percent of those who said peace had 
become less secure, held NATO tobe necessary (FGW 5/83). Again, this 
is not a paradox, as it may seem at first glance, but the product of a 
minority strongly believing at the same time that war is imminent and that 
our familiar way of trying to prevent it in the framework of military 
alliance should be abandoned. 
In an October 1979 BMV survey, the data on perceived reliability of the 
United States and of NATO and on trust in the United States are almost 
identical, so only figures on reliability of NATO are reproduced in Table 
4.32. Obviously, the level of information on defense matters and the 
evaluation of the priority of national security were virtually unrelated to 
judgments on the reliability of the Western alliance. People with higher 
interest in national security, on the other band, rated the reliability of 
NATO slightly above average. Finally, the higher respondents judged the 
importance of the armed forces, the more likely they were to have 
confidence in NATO. 
IMAGES OF DETERRENCE AND OF THE ALLIES 
Not surprisingly, evaluations of NATO are to a considerable degree 
related to opinions as to what the West should do if there would be no 
agreement in Geneva. As in May 1983 (FGW) almost three out of four 
respondents were in favor of continuing talks without missile deployment, 
there can be no dramatic associations, but what can be observed is strong 
enough: 70 percent of supporters of NATO preferred continuing negotia-
tions over alternatives that would imply stationing missiles in the FRG; 
among those who thought NATO tobe unnecessary this proportion was 
91 percent. 
154 HANS RAITINGER 
Table4.32 Salience of national security, information, and interest and reliability of 
NATO (BMV 10/79) 
In case of conflict we could rely upon NATO 
to a to a 
!arge limited 
completely extent extent not at all 
Bundeswehr is 
Very important 48 36 14 2 
lmportant 23 56 20 1 
Less important 7 37 46 9 
National security is a 
top political priority 
Yes 29 47 21 3 
No 24 48 25 3 
Information on defense 
Very good 27 46 24 3 
Good 23 48 24 4 
Deficient 25 48 24 3 
lnterest in media reports 
on defense 
Yes 33 44 21 2 
No 21 49 26 3 
Attitudes on ERWs in a study by FGW in August 1981 were in a 
remarkable way connected to perceptions of bilateral relations between the 
FRG and the United States. In general, agreement with the decision to 
build ERWs was about ten percent above agreement with their possible 
deployment in the FRG. Both these approval rates were unrelated to the 
perception of the current quality of bilateral relations as such. If people 
were asked about the development of bilateral relations since President 
Reagan was elected, however, the connection with their responses on 
ERWs was very close. Respondents who saw recent improvements of 
relations were considerably more favorable of these weapons in general 
and of their deployment in the FRG than those who saw no change or a 
deterioration. This pattern was even more dramatic with respect to direct 
evaluations of the U.S. president. lt is therefore probably fair to say that 
these attitudes on specific weapon systems reßect general pro- and anti-
American sentiments fueled by opinions about the current U.S. leadership 
rather than calculations of these systems' relative merits or disadvantages. 
Opinions on ERWs furthermore were linked to attitudes on what 
relations between the partners of the Western alliance should look like. 
Table 4.33 documents that if the United States, rather than NATO, was 
regarded as being in charge of decisions of this kind, approval of ERWs 
tended to be higher. Similarly, in the same survey 66 percent of those 
Teble4.33 Evaluations of FRG-US relations and attitudes on ERW (FGW 8/81) 
FRG-US FRG-US relations since Evaluation of Who should 
relations President Reagan was elected President Reagan decide on ERW 
US 
Bad Good Deteriorated Remained lmproved -2 -1 ±1 +1 +2 NATO alone 
Building ERW 
Agreement 36 40 32 40 61 9 14 25 53 76 35 57 
Disagreement 64 60 68 60 39 91 86 75 47 24 65 43 
ERW deployment 
in FRG 
Agreement 30 31 22 26 49 10 12 21 41 60 25 34 
Disagreement 70 69 78 74 51 90 88 79 59 40 75 66 
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respondents who said that in case of disagreement the FRG should adopt 
U.S. views agreed to the stationing of ERWs, opposition to these 
warheads among those who wanted the Federal Republic to pursue her 
own interests ran at 81 percent. Summarily this could be interpreted as 
follows: general acceptance of the Western alliance is very high but 
support erodes quickly if conflicts of interest are presented to respon-
dents. If this conflict takes the form of announcing the possibility of 
introducing additional nudear weapons not very much of this support 
survives. 
SUMMARY OF PATTERNS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
As has been stated in the introduction to this section, the multitude of 
associations between individual survey items presented here could not be 
selected according to substantive criteria but had to be accepted according 
to availability. What condusions do they allow? 
First, most of the non-zero relationships that could be reported are as 
one would expect. However, in many cases measures that should or could 
be related in fact are unrelated. Even if there is covariation, it often is 
rather weak in the aggregate. This can mean only one thing, of course: 
that in some people's attitudes there is a dear-cut structure, although in 
many others' there is none. In many cross-tabulations off-diagonal re-
sponses prevail. Consistency among defense-related attitudes at the indi-
vidual level is not particularly high, which, in turn, is another indicator of 
low personal salience. 
Second, even though we have not been able-because of the particulari-
ties of the available data base-to simplify the complex picture of numer-
ous indicators by reducing them to a smaller number of dimensions, one 
can probably claim that such a solution still would have to be multidimen-
sional. Raeder's (1982) optimism-pessimism dimension, which is derived 
from threat perception, expectations of East-West relations, and personal 
salience of national security, appears as too simple. Salience and cognitions 
should be kept apart, and affective components, such as pro- or anti-
military or American feelings, seem tobe important, as is indicated by the 
effect of evaluations of the current American president. Let us now turn to 
the question of whether the associations between defense attitudes and 
nondefense variables may be stronger than the ones among national 
security items themselves. 
Nondefense Correlates of Public Opinion on National Security 
IMAGES OF THE SOVIET UNION 
Table 4.34 reveals that there is some variation of images of the Soviet 
Union among the categories of various variables indicating people's posi-
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Table 4.34 Images of the Soviet Union and social structure (FGW 5/83) 
Who is superior Military threat 
East Both equal West Yes No 
Sex 
Men 44 44 11 45 55 
Women 49 40 10 51 49 
Age 
18-24 40 46 13 47 53 
25-29 35 55 8 47 53 
30-39 42 44 14 51 49 
40-49 52 36 11 44 56 
50-59 46 44 10 49 51 
60- 52 39 9 49 51 
Educationa 
Low 54 38 7 45 55 
Medium 48 42 10 45 55 
High 41 44 14 53 47 
Size of city 
- 5,000 52 36 12 44 56 
5,000- 20,000 44 46 10 49 51 
20,000-100,000 50 42 8 47 53 
100,000- 43 42 14 49 51 
Church attendance 
Often 54 38 7 53 47 
Now and then 47 42 11 45 55 
Seldom, never 44 45 11 48 52 
Total 47 42 11 48 52 
8 Low: Hauptschule only; high: at least Mittlere Reife 
tion in the social structure, but that this variation is not dramatic. Women 
in the May 1983 FGW survey were somewhat more "pessimistic" in 
evaluating the military balance and the military threat than men. Those 
with better education more often regarded the West as militarily superior 
and the military threat as high. Frequent church attendance, as a measure 
of intensity of religious feeling, was related to higher perception of threat 
and of Eastern superiority. 
Perceptions of the military balance differed somewhat with the size of 
the place of residence; in rural towns and villages the East was judged 
superior by more respondents than in major cities. With respect to the age 
of respondents, there was little variation in perceptions of the military 
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Table 4.35 Images of the Soviet Union and party preference (FGW 5/83) 
Who is superior Military threat 
East Both equal West Yes No 
SPD 41 49 10 44 56 
CDU/CSU 52 37 10 46 54 
FDP 41 47 12 58 42 
Green party 24 52 24 77 23 
threat. Those between 25 and 29 held the most "optimistic" views of the 
military balance. Respondents younger than 30 were below average in 
perceiving Eastern superiority but at the same time held "normal" threat 
perceptions. The former observation may be a function of "political 
generations" (these people went through their politically formative years 
between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s, the era of detente), but this 
concept falls to explain why the youngest age groups tended to evaluate 
Eastern military superiority less than others while having average threat 
perception. Some light can be shed on this result, however, by looking at 
the distributions according to party preference. 
From Table 4.35 we learn that perceptions of threat and of the military 
balance are much more closely related to party preference than to social 
structure. Adherents of the CDU/CSU were most "pessimistic" about 
Soviet superiority, followers of the SPD and the FDP were below average 
in reporting Eastern superiority, and three out of four sympathizers of the 
Green party denied Eastern military superiority. The ranking of followers 
of the three established parties on threat perception was not the same, 
potential SPD voters feeling roughly the same threat as potential CDU/ 
CSU voters. Adherents of the Green party, on the other band, had by far 
the strongest perception of threat. For these people the measure of 
military threat was not-as with all other respondents--almost exclusively 
related to the power of the East. They were very likely to see a military 
threat, but not necessarily one attached to Eastern military superiority and 
rather refiecting a more general fear of war in spite of the predominant 
perception of parity. The high percentage of followers of the Green party 
in the youngest age groups thus explains the discrepancy between percep-
tions of the military balance and of threat recorded in Table 4.34. 
IMAGES OF SECURITY 
The survey results that have been incorporated in to Table 4.36 indicate 
that men and women did not differ in their perceptions of the stability of 
peace in Europe or in the personal importance attached to protection 
against an Eastern attack. Women, however, viewed good relations of the 
Table4.36 Images of security and social structure 
Position 
Peace in Europe Personal importance Percentage toward 
in past year of protection good relations defense The peace movement is 
Less More secure, against with the East spending don't 
secure no change Russian attack very important (ABI necessary superfluous detrimental care 
(FGW 5/83) (FGW9/80)a (FGW 2/83) 12/82)b {FGW 5/83) 
Sex 
Men 36 64 7.6 21 3.0 48 23 9 20 
Women 39 61 7.7 26 2.5 46 24 5 26 
Age 
18-24 41 59 7.0 20 2.3 61 18 3 19 
29-29 43 57 6.2 22 2.7 69 11 6 14 
30-39 45 55 7.5 22 2.6 52 17 7 23 
40-49 34 66 7.8 23 2.8 45 25 8 22 
50-59 29 72 7.7 26 2.9 40 26 8 27 
60- 37 63 8.4 25 2.8 35 32 7 27 
Education 
Low 34 65 8.3 26 2.6 36 24 7 33 
Medium 37 64 7.8 23 2.8 44 26 7 24 
High 41 58 7.2 23 2.7 57 21 6 16 
Size of city 
- 5,000 35 65 7.9 12 2.9 48 24 4 25 
5,000- 20,000 31 69 8.0 21 2.3 40 28 7 26 
20 ,000-100 ,000 39 61 7.5 24 2.9 49 25 4 22 
100,000- 42 58 7.4 29 2.6 49 19 11 21 
Church attendance 
Often 32 68 8.0 21 2.8 36 30 8 26 
Now and then 36 63 7.7 23 2.7 44 25 6 26 
Seldom, never 40 60 7.6 23 2.7 54 19 7 19 
Total 38 62 7.7 23 2.7 47 24 7 23 
aAverage score on scale from O (no personal importance) to 10 (highest personal importance) 
bAverage score on scale from 1 (should be strongly reduced) to 7 {should be strongly increased) 
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FRG with the East as somewhat more important, were more in favor of 
reducing military spending, and were more indifferent toward the peace 
movement. 
In the various age groups we again see the youngest two groupings as 
deviating from average attitudes. Tue youngest respondents expressed 
stronger feelings that peace in Europe had become less stable recently, a 
finding that supports what has been said above on their level of anxiety 
and fear that did not stem from widespread perceptions of an Eastern 
threat but from more general notions of the political and military insecu-
rity of the current world. At the same time, the younger respondents were 
the ones most "optimistic" about the Eastern bloc. Conforming to percep-
tions of the military balance (Table 4.34), protection against Eastern 
attack was least important to people between 18 and 29 years of age. The 
personal salience of good relations with the East increases only slightly 
with age. The same trend is visible in attitudes toward defense spending, 
but here the youngest age bracket set itself apart more clearly from the 
others by advocating, on the average, rather sizeable reductions. Not 
surprisingly, the youngest were fondest of the peace movement; two thirds 
rated it as "necessary," and only one-third of the oldest respondents did 
so. lndifference increased somewhat, while rejections of the peace move-
ment rose with age from 21 to 39 percent. 
Correlates of education can be detected in attitudes toward the peace 
movement and toward the importance of protection against Russian 
attack. Respondents with low formal education attributed much more 
importance to military protection and were far less convinced of the 
necessity of the peace movement. If one combines high education with 
youth-a combination typical of sympathizers of the Green party-this is 
the group of people to whom the peace movement appeals most:. The same 
two indicators of images of security also co-vary with urbanization and 
religious practice; in addition, good relations with the East are deemed 
much more important by respondents from cities than from villages. 
People from the countryside and/or with close ties to their church are far 
more worried about protection against a Russian attack than city dwellers 
and/or less religious respondents; support for the peace movement is 
highest among people with weak ties to their church. 
Again, the relationship between images of security and party preference 
is much closer than the one between these images and positions in the 
social structure. On most indicators in Table 4.37 the followers of the 
Green party deviate even more strongly from adherents of the three 
established parties than on the images of the Soviet Union in Table 4.35. 
An overwhelming majority of Green voters viewed peace in Europe as 
having become less secure. At this point we can also demonstrate the 
reason for the strong aggregate decline of perceptions of peace having 
become less secure from May 1982 to May 1983 that has been reported in 
Table 4.11. Most of this change is due to the attitudes of CDU/SCU 
followers, 58 percent of whom in spring 1982 believed peace to have 
Table 4.37 Images of security and party preference 
SPD 
CDU/CSU 
FDP 
Green Party 
a,bcompare Table 4.36. 
Peace in Europe 
in past year 
less More secure, 
secure no change 
(FGW 5/83) 
45 55 
27 73 
42 58 
73 27 
Personal importance 
of protection 
against 
Russian attack 
(FGW 9/8o)a 
7.3 
8.3 
7.4 
4.8 
Percentage 
good relations 
with the East 
very important 
(FGW2/83) 
26 
21 
18 
18 
Position 
toward 
defense The peace movement is 
spending don't 
(ABI necessary superfluous detrimental care 
12/82)b (FGW 5/83) 
2.3 58 17 2 23 
3.1 35 30 11 25 
3.0 57 18 7 18 
1.6 93 4 0 3 
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become less secure; in spring 1983, this figure had dropped to 27 percent. 
Obviously, threat perception is a function of whether the composition of 
government conforms to one's wishes at least as much as it is a function of 
what is going on in international politics. 
Sympathizers of the Green party also gave very low priority to military 
protection, which was evaluated as most important by sympathizers of the 
Christian parties. The salience of good relations with the East was not a 
very partisan issue, even though it rank.ed highest, as one should expect, 
for Social Democratic voters. Positions toward defense spending, on the 
other hand, varied widely even between adherents of the three established 
parties. Those who intended to vote for either of the current government 
parties on the average were in favor of small reductions. Followers of the 
Green party desired very deep cuts in the military budget, of course, and 
Social Democratic voters rank.ed in between. Finally, attitudes vis-a-vis 
the peace movement are distributed roughly as one should expect, Green 
voters being enthusiastic, CDU/CSU voters being very sceptical, with 
FDP and SPD leaners being in between. 
IMAGES OF DETERRENCE 
From Table 4.38 some associations between images of deterrence and 
respondents' position in the social structure emerge. Opposition against 
ERWs, either in general or on FRG territory, was strongest in the 
youngest age group and weakest in the middle-aged group (30 to 39 years). 
Women were significantly less willing than men to accept new nuclear 
weapons in the FRG, either in the framework of NATO's December 1979 
decision or in the context of the modernization of TNF. An absolute 
majority among men refused to support the demand to deploy no new 
missiles in the FRG regardless of Soviet behavior, although almost two-
thirds of the women endorsed that position. Nearly half of the surveyed 
men agreed with the American president's decision to build ERWs, but 
more than two-thirds of the women disapproved of this decision. 
Women in spring and summer of 1983 also were less inclined than men 
to concede compatibility between Christian values and nuclear arms, to 
accept new missiles in the area where they lived, or to deploy INF in case 
of failure of the Geneva negotiations, in these attitudes women were 
closest to the youngest respondents. Acceptance of nuclear weapons 
increased somewhat with education and with intensity of religious prac-
tice. As has already been mentioned, those with little tie to their church 
most strongly believed nuclear weaponry to be incompatible with Chris-
tian faith. 
lf one separately examines these attitudes for the adherents of the 
various parties, however, one finds far more significant discrepancies than 
between the two sexes (Table 4.39). Naturally, very few of those who 
intended to vote for the Green party agreed to any new nuclear weapons. 
But even among those leaning toward the SPD and the FDP there were 
Table4.38 Images of deterrence and social structure (FGW) 
Agreement 
with For Christians nuclear Acceptance What to do if no agreement 
demand weapons are: of in Geneva? 
not to Accep- deployment Continue 
deploy any Agreement Agreement table of new negotiations, Continue 
new with with ERW for Not missiles in no negotiations, Deploy 1 N F, 
missiles in decisit6n to deployment Accep- defense accep- respondent' s deployment deployment discontinue 
FRG buildlERW in FRG table only table area of INF of INF negotiations 
2/83 8/81 8/81 4/83 6/83 7/83 
Sex 
Men 47 46 36 12 46 42 31 72 25 3 
Women 62 32 26 7 42 51 14 80 17 3 
Age 
18-24 59 29 26 6 36 58 18 85 13 2 
25-29 57 37 34 7 27 65 21 86 12 2 
30-39 57 45 36 5 47 48 28 74 20 6 
40-49 51 36 31 14 47 39 23 72 24 4 
50-59 53 34 27 13 49 38 21 74 25 1 
60- 57 42 30 8 47 45 19 73 23 4 
Education 
Low 61 35 24 4 46 50 12 80 16 4 
Medium 53 43 34 11 46 42 25 75 22 3 
High 54 34 29 10 39 51 22 75 21 3 
Size of city 
- 5,000 51 42 32 5 57 38 20 76 20 4 
5,000- 20,000 59 46 35 8 46 46 22 71 25 4 
20 ,000-100 ,000 58 32 27 10 48 42 29 78 18 4 
100,000- 53 34 28 11 36 53 17 79 19 2 
Church attendance 
Often 48 43 36 9 52 39 23 66 30 4 
Nowand then 56 38 29 10 50 40 20 76 21 3 
Seldom, never 59 38 31 9 34 57 23 82 15 3 
Total 56 38 31 9 44 47 21 76 21 3 
Table4.39 Images of deterrence and party preference (FGW) 
Agreement 
with For Christians nuclear Acceptance What to do if no agreement 
demand weapons are: of in Geneva? 
not to Accep- deployment Continue 
deploy any Agreement Agreement table of new negotiations, Continue 
new with with ERW for Not missiles in no negotiations, Deploy 1 N F, 
missiles in decision to deployment Accep- defense accep- respondent's deployment deployment discontinue 
FRG build ERW in FRG table only table area of INF of INF negotiations 
2/83 8/81 8/81 4/83 6/83 7/83 
SPD 66 28 21 7 37 56 10 87 11 1 
CDU/CSU 40 54 42 14 54 33 35 62 33 5 
FDP 66 20 21 12 53 35 23 71 22 7 
Green party 73 13 10 1 14 85 3 96 4 0 
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two-thirds-or even larger-majorities against new nuclear missiles in the 
FRG, against building ERWs, or against deploying them in the Federal 
Republic. Surprisingly, followers of these two parties were rather similar 
in these attitudes both in fall 1981 and in 1983. The electorate of the 
liberal party in the 1983 election without any doubt had been very much 
different from previous elections and had become most similar to that part 
of the electorate leaning toward the CDU/CSU, as also was evident in 
Table 4.37 with regard to positions on the defense budget. Considering the 
rejection of missile deployment in the FRG, however, the old SPD-FDP 
coalition was still visible in 1983, at least on the part of the electorate. 
Those who said they intended to vote for the CDU/CSU, on the other 
hand, by their very different opinions seemed to justify the "missile party" 
(Raketenpartei) charge brought against these parties by the SPD during 
the recent campaign: 60 percent would not endorse the demand to refuse 
any new missiles in the FRG under all circumstances, 54 percent agreed to 
the building of ERWs, 42 percent said they would even agree to their 
deployment in the FRG, 35 percent stated support for stationing new 
missiles in the area where they live, and 38 percent advocated INF 
deployment if the Geneva negotiations should fail. 
IMAGES OF ALLIES 
In 1982 and 1983, women were very close to men iri their attitudes on 
NATO and on U.S.-German relations. While urbanization likewise had 
little to do with evaluations of NATO and the United States, some 
consistent patterns can be observed in Table 4.40 of positive images of 
U.S.-FRG relations and the Western Alliance becoming more frequent 
with age and strength of respondents' religious convictions and less 
frequent with better education. These associations are clearly visible but 
far from being dramatic. 
Compared to previous tables, most interrelations between images of the 
allies and party preference (Table 4.41) are not very strong; still they are 
much stronger than with social structure. Followers of the two parties 
then supporting the government of Helmut Schmidt and those who leaned 
toward the CDU/CSU in August 1982 rated bilateral U.S.-FRG relations 
almost equally, sympathizers of the Green party most frequently perceived 
them tobe bad. CDU/CSU voters most likely regarded strained relations 
with the United States as an indication of the German government's 
failure to avoid frictions and thus were most inclined to have the Federal 
Republic follow U.S. leadership. Green voters, on the other band, proba-
bly saw problems in bilateral relations predominantly as the outcome of 
U. S. foreign policy, so they joined supporters of the government coalition 
in rejecting the adoption of U.S. positions by the FRG in case of 
disagreement. For the supporters of the coalition parties SPD and FDP 
this rejection did not follow from similar perceptions of a bad climate of 
relations for which the United States was to blame, but from the judgment 
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Table4.40 Images of the allies and social structure (FGW) 
Relations In case of disagreement 
between US FRG should NATO is 
and FRG are adopt US decide according not 
Good Bad positions to own interests necessary necessary 
8/82 5/82 5/83 
Sex 
Men 58 42 31 69 91 9 
Women 59 41 27 73 89 11 
Age 
18-24 49 51 30 70 82 18 
25-29 57 43 26 74 85 15 
30-39 60 40 26 74 90 10 
40-49 61 39 27 73 92 8 
50-59 58 42 35 65 90 10 
60- 62 38 31 69 93 7 
Education 
Low 60 40 28 72 92 8 
Medium 61 39 33 67 92 8 
High 55 45 26 74 86 14 
Size of city 
- 5,000 64 36 24 76 90 10 
5,000- 20,000 59 41 42 58 93 7 
20,000-100 ,000 55 45 25 75 89 11 
100,000- 59 41 26 74 88 12 
Church attendance 
Often 61 39 35 65 96 4 
Nowand then 59 41 32 68 91 9 
Seldom, never 57 43 24 76 87 13 
Total 59 41 29 71 90 10 
that bilateral affairs were quite satisfactory, so there was no need for 
subordination in order to improve them. 
Attitudes on NATO, finally, were most polarized along partisan lines in 
spring 1983. Wbile almost identical overwhelming majorities of CDU/ 
CSU and FDP adherents regarded NATO as necessary for the FRG, SPD 
followers were significantly less enthusiastic, and Green voters were least 
convinced of the alliance's indispensability. lt should be stressed, how-
ever, that even in this latter group, which was most critical of NATO, a 
majority of respondents judged the alliance as necessary. Rejection of new 
nuclear weapons (see Table 4.39) for more than half of the sympathizers of 
the Green party was not equivalent to rejection of the Western Alliance. 
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Table 4.41 Images of the allies ancl party pnfarenca (FGW) 
SPD 
CDU/CSU 
FDP 
Green party 
Conclusion 
Relations 
between US 
and FRG are 
Good Bad 
59 
61 
66 
44 
8/82 
41 
39 
34 
56 
1 n case of disagreement 
FRG should 
adopt US decide according 
positions to own interests 
5/82 
24 
39 
18 
21 
76 
61 
82 
79 
NATO is 
not 
necessary necessary 
5/83 
86 
96 
95 
56 
14 
4 
6 
43 
After presenting such a multitude of descriptive findings and associations 
among attitudes, an extended critical summary and final evaluation of 
results is required. Let us begin by repeating that the data base was far 
from satisfactory. Available survey items on security issues have turned 
out to be scattered over a multitude of studies, and on several relevant 
topics we have no measurements at all from the past couple of years. The 
lack of comprehensive recent investigations of the subject stands in 
strange contrast to frequent allegations of dramatic changes in the mass 
support for Western defense in the FRG. National security issues still are 
marginal in most public opinion surveys in this country. Our evidence 
would suggest that this may somehow correspond to respondents' evalua-
tions. 
In the descriptive portions of this chapter, much contradictory and 
inconclusive evidence was presented but we have not been able to identify 
major dramatic shifts in national security attitudes in the early 1980s. In 
their affective orientations toward the actors of security policy, large 
majorities of West Germans are still sceptical and critical of the USSR and 
friendly toward the Western Alliance and the United States. The latter are 
both evaluated as reliable and as necessary for security. This sympathy is 
restricted to a defensive and peaceful alliance that does not constitute a 
dangerous commitment. As long as this perception prevails, tendencies 
toward neutralism are blocked off by fears of losing American friendship 
and support. This has already been described as the fundamental situation 
in the FRG in the 1950s by Deutsch and Edinger (1959,23f.). Their 
analysis appears to remain valid. 
Perceptions of the factual framework of national security and expecta-
tions of hypothetical futures seem to follow closely spectacular and well 
publicized events in the international arena, again with no really dramatic 
changes over the past few years. Dissent within the Western Alliance and 
the deterioration of East-West relations, proclaimed by many as the 
ultimate failure of detente, have had very predictable effects on public 
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opinion in the FRG. The relations of the FRG with both superpowers are 
seen as somewhat worse than they used to be. The East is perceived as 
somewhat more superior and threatening, war as somewhat more likely, 
and defense as more difficult. In view of the information input into public 
opinion all other trends would be very surprising indeed. 
These changes in perceptions have not been sufficiently strong, how-
ever, to effect any realignment in the importance ascribed to national 
security issues for the FRG as a whole and for individuals. Assessments of 
salience are hardly straightforward, but generally speaking there seem to 
be many more pressing concerns. This, of course, is a function of 
discontent. If things within an issue area are going satisfactorily it will be 
considered less important than others. National security issues are less 
salient than others partly because they are so remote to individuals, but 
partly also because many people are willing to tolerate security policy as it 
is and tend to view it as sufficiently successful. Unfortunately, we have not 
been able to present very much longitudinal evidence on the general 
public's level of information on these matters. The data we have indicate it 
is rather low. 
The key contradictions among the attitudes we have reviewed occur 
between higher order and lower order national security instruments. 
Defense and deterrence are widely accepted as very general principles, 
especially if deterrence is conceptually related to the prevention of war and 
thus benefits from the universal desire for peace. As soon as it comes to the 
operational implications of these principles, however, opposition exceeds 
support. The feasibility of defense and specific scenarios are evaluated 
critically, and there is little enthusiasm about defense preparations, mili-
tary expenditures, or nuclear weapons. 
If contemplated in isolation, these measurements of public opinion 
could be construed as supporting the notion of a wholesale erosion of the 
national security consensus in the FRG. Anyone who would jump to this 
conclusion, however, must first consider what else one should expect. One 
can argue for a number of reasons that the apparent contradiction between 
levels of support is only normal. As matters of national security are not 
very salient concerns, it is cognitively very easy to judge stimuli according 
to the emotional associations they evoke without recognizing or consider-
ing contradictions. Deterrence and defense are sufficiently abstract no-
tions to be endorsed in the framework of positive feelings about national 
sovereignty, independence, and self-determination. The specifics of these 
notions are rejected, however, as these global objectives are perceived as 
existing, which in turn allows people to rate national security low in 
salience. Thus, if deterrence is seen as useful and as working satisfactorily, 
support for measures to maintain this state of affairs can be very low. 
Psychological repression seems to work that way. 
The decrease in support for defense that one might be tempted to read 
into our data of the past fewyears is probably more apparent than real, but 
comparable earlier data simply is not available as there was no political 
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incentive to poll such attitudes. The rise of the peace movement and the 
extensive refiection of its concerns in the media have introduced items on 
the apparent issues of the day into surveys on which there is no strictly 
comparable evidence from earlier years. This is a universal feature of 
commercial surveys, and it can lead to dramatic exaggerations of changes 
in public opinion, if, for example, current rejection of INF is compared to 
the general acceptance of NATO in the 1960s or 1970s. In the past few 
years survey items have tended to go beyond the very general national 
security attitudes polled earlier and to focus on specific issues of budgets 
and weapons. lt is very likely that responses to those specific stimuli 
would not have been much different had they been presented to respon-
dents in the past. Nuclear weapons, or more particularly nuclear weapons 
in the FRG or to be exploded on her territory, have always been very 
unpopular in this country if one asked the appropriate questions (cf. 
Deutsch and Edinger 1959,27). · 
As there are no directly comparable longitudinal data we cannot tell for 
sure whether attitudes on specific issues of Western strategy have in fact 
become somewhat less favorable in recent years or not. If this should have 
been the case, however, there could be a very plausible explanation. As is 
well known, nuclear strategy as the key element of Western deterrence for 
a long time has received diverging interpretations in Western Europe and 
in the United States. The version presented to the public in the FRG by 
leading political figures and the media usually has been one extending the 
basic notion of "massive retaliation," stressing the key role of American 
strategic nuclear weapons and downplaying the importance of conven-
tional forces. Conventional strength even tended to get interpreted as 
dysfunctional, as weakening the linkage of American central systems to 
the security of Europe. Escalation into the general nuclear exchange was 
described as the primary vehicle to guarantee security: "Either they ( the 
East) leave us alone or we all perish"-so they will leave us alone. As 
threatening mutual annihilation is the business of the United States, 
rejecting improvements or increases of the West German defense contribu-
tion is consistent with this image of security. Accepting deterrence in this 
version meant that one could stop thinking or worrying about war and was 
not oneself primarily responsible for deterrence. In 1979 former Secretary 
of Defense Apel said in a radio interview, "Especially with respect to 
nuclear weapons we should kick the habit of imagining their (actual) use. 
Whatever we do militarily in general and in the field of nuclear armament 
in particular is but apart of a deterrence policy" (Yost and Glad 1982). 
In recent years the interpretation of flexible response prevailing in the 
United States has gradually penetrated the West German debate. Its war-
fighting components, "if they start a war they will with high probability 
lose," cannot easily be reconciled with the notions of deterrence cherished 
in the FRG. Dissonance can take various forms. A mild one is the feeling 
that endorsing deterrence as a general principle does not mean one is 
allowed to stop thinking about and preparing for war. The emotional 
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response can be increased rejection of concrete manif estations of military 
defense in general and of nuclear weapons in particular. The stronger 
form of dissonance confuses the war-fighting interpretation of deterrent 
strategy with the desire actually to prepare and fight conventional and/or 
nuclear wars under appropriate circumstances. 
This is not the place to investigate what events, what type of rhetoric by 
whom, or whose mistakes in enlightening and educating the West Ger-
man public are to blame. There can be little doubt, however, that the 
public in the FRG, as in other countries, has recently been exposed to 
information and debates on the security of the alliance that are at variance 
with previous beliefs. lf underneath the continuing majority support for 
the general notions of deterrence and defense the attitudes toward their 
practical requirements and toward the peace movement should have 
changed, this is most likely primarily due to this exposure. Fora small but 
vocif erous minority, the reaction has not been confined to those less salient 
attitudes on how best to provide for deterrence and defense but has 
extended to rejection of the Western alliance as a whole and of established 
approaches to national security. This pattern is characteristic of part of the 
peace movement, to which these things are of central concern, and lends 
itself to broad media coverage producing exaggerated laments about the 
waning of the national security consensus. For the majority, the implica-
tions of war-fighting notions of deterrent strategy are equally unpleasant 
and may reduce support for military spending, nuclear weapons, etc. but 
are not salient enough to effect widespread and dramatic alterations in the 
general images of national security. 
We have seen that public opinion on national security in West Germany 
co-varies quite strongly with individuals' party preference, much stronger 
than with their position in the social system. This immediately presents us 
with a puzzle, of course, that refers back to some of the questions raised in 
the introduction: what is the cause and what is the effect, attitudes on 
national security issues or party preference? 
From all established knowledge of electoral research and sociology it is 
saf e to conclude that opinions on national security determine political 
behavior only for a very small fraction of the electorate. Compared to long-
lasting partisan identifications and candidate orientations, issue positions 
generally have the lowest impact on voter choice. This is particularly true 
for foreign policy issues in general, and in view of the low salience of 
national security that has been described above it must be so for the 
attitudes we have been examining. lt is inconceivable that more than very 
small minorities behave politically as they do because of their insights, 
beliefs, or positions on national security. These, however, are people that 
require the party they have previously been associated with to conform to 
their preferences on national security; if it fails to do so they will turn to 
someone else. This pattern certainly is descriptive of the behavior of some 
Green voters, and some activities of the Social Democrats over the recent 
years can be interpreted as attempts to prevent this from happening. 
But how about the overwhelming majority of those whose political 
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behavior is not determined by national security attitudes? Are their 
opinions on these matters simply products of their partisan attachment; do 
they only reproduce what their party teils them as they lack independent 
yardsticks to arrive at evaluations of their own? This is a plausible 
alternative interpretation of the co-variation between national security 
attitudes and party preferences, but not the only one. This co-variation 
also could be largely spurious if political behavior is determined by more 
or less consistent patterns of political cognitions and affective orientations 
vis-a-vis problems outside the area of national security that at the same 
time influence opinions on defense. Such patterns could be called "con-
servative," "liberal," "socialist," "progressive," "materialist," "noncon-
formist," "revolutionary," and so forth, each term denoting a specific 
combination of various dimensions of basic political orientations as well as 
its antecedents in social structure, socialization, and so on. These clusters 
can very likely be responsible for maintaining partisan affi.liations, once 
acquired, but also for shaping attitudes on "new" issues that are brought 
in line with existing ones. For those people for whom this interpretation is 
valid, party preference and national security attitudes obviously have to 
co-vary, but there is no causal relationship. They vote for the party closest 
to their duster of basic orientations and take opinions in the less salient 
field of national security that feel consistent with these orientations. 
Regarding these voters, parties to a certain extent have to follow public 
opinion, in order to avoid creating inconsistencies. On the other hand, 
they can utilize their publicized stand on particular issues to hold their 
supporters together by assuring them that they can feel "at home" with 
them even on issues other than the fundamental ones that constitute the 
initial allegiance. 
Yet if one allows for the possibility of parties "educating" their clients 
on issues, particularly less salient ones, one has to take the other possibil-
ity seriously: that partisan pref erences can infiuence issue positions. The 
boundary line to the second interpretation is rather ill-defined of course. 
There may be people who have derived their national security attitudes 
from their more general political convictions but are willing to be con-
vinced by the party they feel comfortable with that these general convic-
tions go along better with different positions on these particular matters. 
There might be others who derive no discernible original national security 
attitudes of their own and wait tobe "educated." lf the parties face this 
challenge and play their role in the formation of political will, as the West 
German Federal Constitution teils them to do, correlations between party 
loyalties and opinions on national security have to be found for these 
segments of the electorate as weil, but they will be causal rather than 
spurious correlations. These individuals will not hold :firmly based views 
on defense and security, but will tend to reproduce what the political elites 
they trust feed into the echo chamber of public opinion. Parties then 
would not be stimulated and guided by public opinion, but would direct it 
themselves. 
Naturally, these three classes are ideal-types, and it is difficult to teil for 
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sure for a given individual or group of individuals to which they belong. 
Transition over time between these categories can occur, just as people, at 
the same time, might belong to one dass with regard to one set of issues 
and to another dass regarding other issues. One might, for example, find 
people who, for whatever reasons, have strong personal convictions about 
the necessity of close political and military cooperation between the 
United States and the FRG, but have never independently thought about 
the nuclear threshold. Even though the lines separating the three classes 
are obscure, it is evident that they have a lot to do with the personal 
salience of the issues at stake. This insight enables us to state with some 
confidence what the current situation in the FRG looks like, in spite of the 
virtual absence of any serious recent social-psychological research at-
tempting to assess why and under what conditions particular defense 
related attitudes appear in which individuals, why and for whom they 
become more or less salient, what the preconditions for such processes are 
in terms of political socialization, and why particular issues shoot to the 
foreground of public opinion or are taken up by elites. Even preliminary 
answers to these questions would require considerable research efforts, 
but for now we have to do with the available evidence. 
This evidence tells us that the salience of national security affairs for 
most people in the FRG has been low and still is low. Therefore, the 
portions falling into the first two classes, those for whom security is an 
overriding concern, and those who have at least some independent 
concepts and notions of their own to enter into a dialogue with the elites, 
even though they might not feel very strongly about these issues, are most 
likely rather small. This has two obvious consequences for a concluding 
judgment on what is going on today in the Federal Republic. 
First, studies that survey highly specific attitudes in the field we are 
dealing with are bound to produce many findings that closely follow party 
lines, as only few people feel so strongly about the issues that they opt for 
the party closest to their views, while very many of the others know so 
little and/or have such a low level of concern that in their responses they 
rely on inputs supplied by sources they trust. Second, what we are 
currently witnessing to a large extent is an elite problem with two facets: 
those few for whom national security is of paramount importance either 
always were attached to the party they regarded as best according to these 
criteria or they have switched their allegiance, possibly to the Green party. 
The great majority, for whom these matters are way down in a list of 
much more pressing priorities, does not face this problem of having to 
translate marginally important views into political action. This majority is 
exposed to debates going on between competing elites that are designed to 
stabilize and motivate the respective groups of followers and that receive 
extensive media coverage. These elite controversies so far have changed 
very little the salience of security policy for the mass public, but they have 
made people aware that national security is another additional dimension 
of the polarization between the parties. But this awareness does not have 
significant political effects. A large majority of people nowadays realize 
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that parties disagree on these issues, they realize the positions taken by the 
political elites they trust, and to a large extent they accept and reproduce 
these positions, so there is disagreement at the level of public opinion as 
weil. But most of this disagreement would not take its current partisan 
shape, much of it would not even be there without the stimulation by 
debates among elites for whom these matters are of utmost importance. 
Ironically, these debates were initiated by the parties--responding to 
minority protest-because some mistakenly assumed that defense issues 
were sufficiently salient to be suitable for a profitable polarization of party 
images. The May 1983 elections have shattered this belief. In short, what 
we are witnessing is not mass protest against established national security 
policy but a combination of minority protest and the dynamics of political 
mass communication. As is generally the case for the social context of 
foreign policy, it is more important to study what is going on within 
activist groups--be they within or outside the established parties--than to 
stare at public opinion because the former shapes the lauer much more 
strongly than vice versa. 
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Appendix C Sources 
In the tables months and years of surveys are generally given together with 
acronyms denoting sources. Sources of data reported in this study are as 
follows: 
BMV: Data from surveys conducted for the Federal Ministry of De-
fense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung) within its "Ver-
teidigungsklima" series. These data have been taken from re-
ports supplied by BMV. 
CC: Data from surveys conducted by Contest-Census, Frankfurt, 
directly provided by CC. 
FGW: Data from the regular ZDF-Politbarometer surveys conducted 
by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim. These data have 
either been taken from tables supplied by FGW or (for 1980) 
computed from the original FGW-datasets. 
IfD: Data from surveys conducted by Institut fuer Demoskopie, 
Allensbach. This data has been taken from IID's Jahrbuch der 
Oeffentlichen Meinung (later Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demosko-
pie). Several more recent results have been directly provided by 
IID. 
PIB: Data from surveys conducted for the Federal Office for Press 
and Information (Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesre-
gierung). These data have been taken from reports supplied by 
PIB. 
SFK: Data from surveys conducted for Sozialwissenschaftliches Fors-
chungsinstitut der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, St. Augustin. 
These data have been computed from the original SFK-datasets. 
SOWI: Data from surveys conducted for Sozialwissenschaftliches Insti-
tut der Bundeswehr, Munich. Unless otherwise indicated, these 
data have been taken from tables in Zoll (1982). 
ZA: Data from surveys conducted by various contractors for various 
customers, supplied through Zentralarchiv fuer empirische So-
zialforschung, Cologne. Surveys are identified by the studynum-
ber assigned to them by the Central Archive. These data have 
been computed from the original data sets. 
